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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In an earlier piece,1 I suggested that the ALI proposals on domes-
tic partnerships,2 by assuming cohabitation and marriage were simi-
lar, but only for the limited purpose of dissolution,3 had created a de-
fault rule4 that few would want.5 Unprotected parties who would 
                                                                                                                      
 * William G. Hammond Professor, University of Iowa. I would like to thank the par-
ticipants at the Florida State University College of Law Symposium on Default Rules in 
Private and Public Law, especially Ian Ayres, Dan Farber, Eric Posner, and Jim Rossi. I 
would also like to thank Jim Lindgren, Eric Rasmusen, Richard McAdams and other par-
ticipants at the Midwestern Law and Economics Association meeting for their helpful 
comments, particularly Douglas W. Allen, who ran some of the regressions, and Leslie 
Harris, who put me in contact with the Oregon Task Force on Family. Research assistants 
who worked tirelessly collecting court data include Nathan Brandeberg and Jamil Gill. 
 1. Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic Partnership: Missing the Target?, 4 J.L. & FAM. 
STUD. 19 (2002). 
 2. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 6 (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. 
 3. As may be obvious from its title, the ALI PRINCIPLES do not attempt to directly in-
fluence ongoing family relationships. Thus, “[i]n view of the scope of these Principles, 
Chapter 6 is limited to the following question: What are the economic rights and responsi-
bilities of the parties to each other at the termination of their nonmarital cohabitation? 
Chapter 6 does not create any rights against the government or third parties.” ALI 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 32. 
 4. There are several articles that discuss default rules. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert 
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 
YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (“The larger class [of legal rules of contracts] consists of ‘default’ 
rules that parties can contract around by prior agreement, while the smaller, but impor-
tant, class consists of ‘immutable’ rules that parties cannot change by contractual agree-
ment.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1416, 1429 (1989) (“[M]any remaining terms of the corporate arrangement are con-
tractual in the sense that they are ‘presets’ of fall-back terms specified by law and not var-
ied by the corporation. These terms become part of the set of contracts just as provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code become part of commercial contracts when not addressed 
explicitly.”); see also Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of 
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Morten Hviid, Default Rules and Equilibrium Se-
lection of Contract Terms, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 233 (1996); Jason Scott Johnston, Stra-
tegic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 
(1990); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological 
Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998); Russell Korobkin, 
The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); J.P. Kos-
tritsky, “Why Infer”? What the New Institutional Economics Has to Say About Law-
Supplied Default Rules, 73 TUL. L. REV. 497 (1998). Even more relevant to this Article, fi-
duciary duties can be seen as default rules. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as 
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marry if they chose (for whom the chapter was presumably in-
tended)6 would not get enough relief because there would be no pro-
tection upon the death of one of them or a requirement of mutual 
support during the relationship.7 Parties who did NOT want to get 
married but wanted to cohabit would find themselves with a set of 
responsibilities upon dissolution that they did not want to assume 
(for if they had, they would have married).8  
 In this Article, I look at another default rule—a preference for 
shared custody (or joint parenting).9 Shared (or joint physical) cus-
tody) has been advocated by divorced men’s interest groups10 with in-
                                                                                                                      
Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209 (1995) (corporations); Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. 
Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999) (elected officials and 
election law); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. 
L. REV. 1225 (1998) (marriage). 
 5. Brinig, supra note 1, at 20 (“[I]nstead of doing what most parties would want or 
what is good for broader society, Chapter 6 both over- and undershoots its target.”). 
 6. Apparently, the ALI wanted to protect same-sex couples, as it defined domestic 
partners as “two persons of the same or opposite sex, not married to one another” and oth-
ers, namely putative spouses, who would otherwise fall between the cracks. ALI 
PRINCIPLES, § 6.01 cmt. d (discussing the difference between the traditional putative 
spouse doctrine and ALI PRINCIPLES). Examples of others that might fall between the 
cracks include victims of fraud and deceit, see, e.g., Alexander v. Kuykendall, 63 S.E.2d 746 
(Va. 1951) (granting damages to “wife” whose “husband” used fraud and deceit to induce a 
marriage), and those who are not legally married but should be estopped from claiming 
otherwise, see Poor v. Poor, 409 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 1980) (equitably estopping “husband” 
who knew of conditions of wife’s extraterritorial divorce from claiming that his subsequent 
marriage to her was invalid); Psaroudis v. Psaroudis, 261 N.E.2d 108 (N.Y. 1970) (collater-
ally estopping “husband” from disclaiming marriage at divorce when he did not disclaim 
marriage in separate maintenance proceeding). 
 7. Brinig, supra note 1, at 29-30. 
 8. Some domestic partner legislation and C-23: Modernization of Benefits and Obli-
gations Act in Canada do this. Winifred Holland, Intimate Relationships in the New Mille-
nium: The Assimilation of Marriage and Cohabitation?, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 114 (2000). It is 
rarer, but the civil union legislation in Vermont would be an example of the duty of sup-
port during the relationship being the same as in marriage. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-
1207 (LEXIS through 2005 Sess.). Even in Norway, where about twenty-five percent of 
couples are unmarried, “[u]nlike married couples, cohabiting couples have no legal respon-
sibility to provide for each other.” Turid Noack, Cohabitation in Norway: An Accepted and 
Gradually More Regulated Way of Living, 15 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 102, 104, 110 (2001). 
Compare the previous legal requirements to the domestic partnership rules for medical in-
surance in Iowa available only to same-sex couples, which require mutual support.  The 
University of Iowa, Domestic Partner Benefits Coverage, http://www.uiowa.edu/hr/benefits/ 
DPB.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). 
 9. E-mail from William Howe, Chair of the Oregon Divorce Task Force, to author 
(Feb. 7, 2005) (on file with author) (defining the two terms as the same and noting that 
statute expresses the preference). 
 10. See American Coalition for Fathers and Children (ACFC), http://www.acfc.org 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2005); Children’s Rights Council, http://www.gocrc.com (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2005); see also Gerald L. Rowles, On Fatherhood, Family, and Civil Belligerence, 
MENSNEWSDAILY.COM, Jan. 20, 2003, http://mensnewsdaily.com/archive/r/rowles/03/ 
rowles012003.htm; Dads Against Discrimination, http://www.peak.org/~jedwards/DADS.html 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (the group in Oregon); Kids Need Both Parents!, 
http://www.kidsneedbothparents.org/kpsusch96.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). The most in-
teresting group currently is the Indiana Civil Rights Council, which is sponsoring class actions 
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creasing frequency of late.11 It has also been touted as a way to re-
duce divorce.12 
 Although strong presumptions of joint custody were popular in the 
1980s when several states adopted them, the more recent practice, 
after some twenty years’ experience, has been to allow joint custody 
as one of several options, rather than to presume that it is in the best 
                                                                                                                      
in fifty jurisdictions against “unconstitutional ‘sole custody.’ ” Indiana Civil Rights Council, 
http://indianacrc.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). A similar though unsuccessful suit based on 
substantive due process and relying on Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), is In re Mar-
riage of Arnold, 679 N.W.2d 296 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). 
 Such a group succeeded in passing a very strong equal custody presumption in 
Iowa. 2004 House Bill 22, sponsored by divorced men’s advocate Dan Boddicker, be-
came law as IOWA CODE § 598.41 (2004). See Thomas Simon, Joint Physical Custody 
for Iowa Children?, THE UNITY WALL, May 24, 2004, http://www.unitywall.com/ 
news.php?pageNum_getNews=2&totalRows_getNews=7. In Oregon, “[n]on-custodial 
parents argued convincingly to the Task Force that, as a general rule, children need 
emotional access to both parents as much as they need financial support.” OREGON 
TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW, FINAL REPORT TO THE 1997 LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 6 
(Dec. 31, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter OREGON TASK FORCE, REPORT]. One 
psychologist whose work is aimed at promoting more involvement by fathers after di-
vorce is Sanford L. Braver. Sanford L. Braver et al., Relocation of Children After Di-
vorce and Children’s Best Interests: New Evidence and Legal Considerations, 17 J. 
FAM. PSYCHOL. 206 (2003). Braver’s website states:  
His primary research interest over the last 15 years or so, in connection with 
Prevention Research Center, has taken him to explore the dynamics of divorc-
ing families, studying approaches to improve the well-being of family members 
after divorce. A special emphasis is dealing with the issues facing divorced fa-
thers as they struggle to maintain their parenting roles after divorce. To sup-
port this work he has been the recipient of 15 competitively reviewed, primarily 
federal, research grants, totaling almost $13 million. His work has been pub-
lished in over 60 peer-reviewed professional articles and chapters, and most re-
cently in the acclaimed 1998 book DIVORCED DADS: SHATTERING THE MYTHS 
[sic] (Tarcher/Penguin-Putnam). This book was a report of his ground-breaking 
work leading the largest federally-supported research project ever conducted on 
divorced fathers. As perhaps the leading expert in the country on the dynamics 
of fathering after divorce, he is in demand as a consultant to such entities as 
President Clinton’s National Fatherhood Initiative, the National Commission 
for Child and Family Welfare, and the State of Arizona’s Domestic Relations 
Reform Subcommittee, and as a speaker and presenter, having delivered over 
100 presentations.  
Arizona  State  University  Faculty:  Sanford Braver, http://www.asu.edu/clas/asuprc/ 
sanfordb.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). However, Braver’s work is controversial, spe-
cifically his study in Relocation of Children After Divorce and Children’s Best Interests: 
New Evidence and Legal Considerations. See The Liz Library, “Move-Aways,” 
http://www.thelizlibrary.org/liz/braver.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (“The study is 
badly conceived and poorly done, but worse than that: Braver, Ellman and Fabricius 
have blatantly misrepresented their findings.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Creed v. Wisconsin, No. 04-00917 (E.D. Wis. 
2004) (Curran, J.) (dismissed with prejudice Sept. 24, 2004); Order Granting Motion to 
Dismiss, Martin v. Florida, No. 04-22385-CIV-Jordan (S.D. Fla. 2005) (Jordan, J.); Class 
Action Complaint, Urso v. Illinois, No. 04-C-6056 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2004) (Kennelly, J.) 
(dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Order and Reasons, Ward v. Louisiana, 
No. 04-CV-2697 (E.D. La.) (Feldman, J.). 
 12. Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring Theo-
ries, 73 IND. L.J. 393, 393 (1998). 
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interests of children. In other words, after experimentation with joint 
custody, some states have realized that continual moving between 
households may be harmful to children,13 that the bulk of newly di-
vorced spouses cannot remain as positively involved with each other 
on an everyday basis as joint physical custody requires,14 or that the 
presumption is causing more litigation to already crowded dockets.15 
 One example of the movement toward and then away from joint 
physical custody comes from Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Assembly set 
up a commission in 1983: 
to study, among other things: (1) existing laws relating to child 
custody determinations in actions affecting the family and the 
limitations of those laws; (2) ways to encourage shared-parenting 
options, including imposing joint custody without the agreement of 
both parties; and (3) ways to provide support services to families 
involved in custody matters to ensure that the best interest of the 
child continues to be served after a child’s parents become divorced 
or separated.16  
 The report generated a significant amendment to the Wisconsin 
statutes in 1987, article 355, section 25-34, to permit awards of joint 
custody even if one party did not agree to the award. Between 1980 
                                                                                                                      
 13. One option is to have the parents do the moving. Dr. Robert Shuman, testifying as 
to the child’s best interest, suggested that an “ideal custodial arrangement” would involve 
the child living in one house and the parents would rotate in and out. Winn v. Winn, 593 
N.W.2d 662, 668 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). He then dismissed the idea as impractical. Id. 
 14. See Murray v. Murray, No. M1999-02081-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 827960, *2 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. June 27, 2000).  
  The parties are equally unhappy with the decision of the trial court, and 
both agree that joint custody is not in the best interest of the children. Interest-
ingly, the trial judge himself stated at the conclusion of the May 12 hearing 
that “there is no way that joint custody is going to continue to work in this 
case. I don’t think it ever really operated or worked,” and “joint custody is an 
onerous burdensome method of raising children between divorced people. It 
rarely really works.” It is unclear why the trial judge chose, despite his own 
grave reservations, to order a joint custody arrangement in this case. Perhaps 
he ruled as he did because of the difficulty of choosing one parent over another, 
when both parties appear from the record to be loving, concerned parents, who 
are obviously eager to do their best for the children.  
  In any case, the parties appear to be in agreement that it would be in the 
best interest of the children for the court to grant custody to only one parent. 
Of course they disagree as to which of them is the more suitable parent to exer-
cise that custody. 
Id. 
 15. The “sheer volume of cases” and congestion it caused was one impetus for creating 
the Oregon Task Force. OREGON TASK FORCE, REPORT, supra note 10, at 4. “In 1993, more 
than one-half of circuit court filings statewide were in family/juvenile law, but fewer than 20 
percent of the court’s resources were devoted to this critical area.”  Id. at 6. Similarly, 75,615 
total civil suits were filed in Iowa in 2002, 48,126 of which were domestic relations cases 
while 27,489 were law and equity matters. STATE COURT ADM’R, 2002 ANNUAL STATISTICAL 
REPORT OF THE IOWA JUDICIAL BRANCH (2003), available at http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/ 
orders/reports/. 
 16. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 cmt. (West, Westlaw through 2003 Act 317). 
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and 1992, joint physical custody awards increased from 2.2% to 
14.2%, according to the Wisconsin Institute for Research on Pov-
erty.17 More recently, although joint legal custody is still preferred 
and the statute calls for maximization of time with both parents, the 
statute considers factors relating to the best interests of the child.18 
During the 2003 session, legislation was passed that would prevent 
an award of joint custody or custody to the batterer in cases of do-
mestic violence.19 
 Similarly, California legislation20 stresses placement with both 
parents, where at all possible, as well as development of a parenting 
plan.21 The statute provides in part: 
                                                                                                                      
 17. Marygold S. Melli, Child Custody in a Changing World: A Study of Postdivorce 
Arrangements in Wisconsin, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 779. 
 18. WIS. STAT. § 767.24 (5) (2000), provides in part:  
Factors in custody and physical placement determinations. (am) Subject to par. 
(bm), in determining legal custody and periods of physical placement, the court 
shall consider all facts relevant to the best interest of the child. The court may 
not prefer one parent or potential custodian over the other on the basis of the 
sex or race of the parent or potential custodian. Subject to par. (bm), the court 
shall consider the following factors in making its determination: 
   1. The wishes of the child’s parent or parents, as shown by any stipulation 
between the parties, any proposed parenting plan or any legal custody or 
physical placement proposal submitted to the court at trial. 
   2. The wishes of the child, which may be communicated by the child or 
through the child’s guardian ad litem or other appropriate professional. 
   3. The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or 
parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s 
best interest. 
   4. The amount and quality of time that each parent has spent with the child 
in the past, any necessary changes to the parents’ custodial roles and any rea-
sonable life-style changes that a parent proposes to make to be able to spend 
time with the child in the future. 
Id. 
 19. 2003 Wis. Act. 130, 2003 Wis. Sess. Laws 651, 653; see also Press Release, Wis. 
Coal. Against Domestic Violence, Wisconsin Coalition Against Domestic Violence Applauds 
Governor Doyle for Acting on Child Custody and Domestic Violence Bill (Assembly Bill 
279) (Feb. 27, 2004), available at www.wcadv.org/?go=download&id=159. The press release 
noted: 
Today at 1:00 p.m., Governor Jim Doyle will take action on a bill to provide 
critical protection to victims of domestic violence and their children. Assembly 
Bill (AB) 279 creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding joint or sole 
custody of children to a domestic batterer when there is evidence of a pattern 
or serious incident of domestic abuse. Until today, Wisconsin’s child custody 
law presumed that joint custody was in the best interest of all children. 
Id. 
 20. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (West, Westlaw through 2006 reg. Sess. urgency legisla-
tion). The language is quite similar to that of Pennsylvania and Texas. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 5301 (West, Westlaw through Act 2005-96) (saying a purpose is “to assure a rea-
sonable and continuing contact of the child with both parents”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
153.001(a)(1) (Vernon 2005) (“The public policy of this state is to assure that children will 
have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the 
best interest of the child.”). 
 21. E-mail from William Howe to author, supra note 9.  
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(b) The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of 
this state to assure that children have frequent and continuing 
contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dis-
solved their marriage, or ended their relationship, and to encour-
age parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing 
in order to effect this policy, except where the contact would not be 
in the best interest of the child, as provided in Section 3011.22  
Although California courts awarded joint physical placement in 
nearly equal shares in most placements between September 1984 
and April 1985, a very thorough study of approximately 1100 fami-
lies in several counties by Professors Maccoby and Mnookin23 re-
ported that after a couple of years, even those couples who were sup-
posed to be dividing custody equally had settled into patterns re-
markably like traditional custody and visitation.24 
 By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, traditional paternal 
custody and guardianship rights had been superseded in America; 
“judicial decisions and complementary legislation had established a 
                                                                                                                      
 22. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020(b). 
 23. See ELEANOR MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND 
LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 9-18 (1992); see also Carol Bohmer & Marilyn L. Ray, Ef-
fects of Different Dispute Resolution Methods on Women and Children After Divorce, 28 
FAM. L.Q. 223, 236 (1994) (“In Georgia, mothers had responsibility for child caretaking, as 
represented by sole or residential custody in [seventy-five] percent of cases, but mothers 
were found to be providing the day-to-day child caretaking in [eighty-four] percent of 
cases.”); Catherine R. Albiston et al., Does Joint Legal Custody Matter?, 2 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 167, 167 (1990) (finding that only twenty percent of families in the study presented 
had joint physical custody decrees). 
 MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra, at 102, also found that ten percent of fathers and seven 
percent of mothers asked for more physical custody than they actually wanted. Twenty 
percent of fathers who wanted maternal custody according to their interviews requested 
joint physical custody or father physical custody. In the unusual cases where mothers ex-
pressed a desire for joint physical custody in their interviews, a third of them still re-
quested sole maternal custody. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 2.02 reporter’s cmts., 
at 102-03. 
 24. “[T]he proportion of families with joint physical custody awards that actually had 
what we have defined as dual residence dropped, from [fifty-two] percent to [forty-five] per-
cent.” MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 23, at 165. Even at the time of initial observation, 
more than two-thirds (67.6%) of the children lived with their mother, while only 16.3% 
lived in “dual” arrangements. Id. at 168 fig.8.1. The authors wrote that the “relatively low 
level of correspondence” reflected, in part, “some informal agreements between parents 
that they would specify joint physical custody in their legal settlement, but that the chil-
dren would actually live with the mother,” and in some cases where “a joint physical cus-
tody decree emerged from extended conflict over custody, in which fathers secured a joint 
decree but did not assume the level of de facto contact required for our dual-residence clas-
sification.” Id. at 165. They found that “[t]he most stable arrangement was mother resi-
dence.” Id. at 170. While they did not find a “trade-off between custody and money issues,” 
id. at 160, they did find that 9.8% of fathers and 6.7% of mothers asked for more physical 
custody than they actually wanted. Id. at 101 tbl.5.3. Approximately twenty percent of fa-
thers who wanted maternal custody requested joint physical custody or paternal physical 
custody. Id. at 100 tbl.5.2. One-third of the small group of mothers who expressed a desire 
for joint physical custody requested sole maternal custody. Id. 
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new orthodoxy, maternal preference.”25 Historically, these two con-
cepts have been part of a progression that also included such rules as 
the “innocent parent rule”26 and the “primary caretaker presump-
tion.”27 The “best interests” of the child has always been the spoken 
goal,28 though the indeterminacy of the standard has been thought to 
lead to the “trading” of financial assets for time with children.29 
                                                                                                                      
 25. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 253 (1985). The maternal preference rule highlights the 
need of a young child for the mother: See, e.g., J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248, 253 (W. Va. 
1978), superseded by statute, W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15(b)(1) (1986), as recognized in David M. 
v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1989) (“From a strictly biological perspective, chil-
dren of the suckling age are necessarily accustomed to close, physical ties with their moth-
ers, and young children, technically weaned, are accustomed to the warmth, softness, and 
physical affection of the female parent. The welfare of the child seems to require that if at 
all possible we avoid subjecting children to the trauma of being wrenched away from their 
mothers, upon whom they have naturally both an emotional and physical dependency. 
While a child is usually emotionally dependent upon his father, he seldom has the same 
physical dependency which he has upon his mother.”). 
 26. Mullen v. Mullen, 49 S.E.2d 349, 358 (Va. 1948) (Hudgins, C.J., dissenting) (com-
plaining that the majority failed to apply the innocent party principle); Owens v. Owens, 
31 S.E. 72, 74 (Va. 1898); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family 
Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1038 (1979); 
see also Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 234 (1975). 
 27. Brooks v. Brooks, 466 A.2d 152, 156-57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); Commonwealth ex 
rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 448 A.2d 1113, 1115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Garska v. McCoy, 278 
S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981); Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711-13 (Minn. 1985). For 
a discussion of why this standard was unsuccessful in Minnesota, see Gary Crippen, Stum-
bling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in 
the Wake of Minnesota’s Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 
MINN. L. REV. 427 (1990). 
 28. All state statutes, regardless of what they require substantively, contain language 
that sets the child’s “best interests” as most important.  The American Law Institute, un-
surprisingly, states that the “primary objective of Chapter 2 is to serve the child’s best in-
terests.”  ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 2.02(1). The differences, then, lie in the proce-
dural and substantive ways that “best interests” are reached. Of course, dissolution of pa-
rental relationships rarely advances the interests of the child. PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN 
BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL 218-20 
(1997) (suggesting that children are only better off if their parents had a highly conflictual 
marriage before divorce, a case that occurs only about thirty percent of the time). Some 
writers have suggested a “least detrimental alternative” standard as being closer to match-
ing what actually occurs. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD 53-64 (n.ed. 1979). James Dwyer suggests that the standards are sometimes ma-
nipulated to simply count along with the rights of parents. James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy 
of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 909-25 (2003). 
 29. This concern is related to the uncertainty opportunities for strategic behavior an-
ticipated by Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979), that caused the primary caretaker pre-
sumption in the first place. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 360-61; Richard Neely, Commentary, 
The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 168, 177-78 (1984) (giving an anecdotal story about the strategic behavior 
used to induce a settlement). The “best interests” test differs, though, because on its face it 
seems fair. See Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 455, 478 (1984); see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Search for Guidance in Determin-
ing the Best Interests of the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint 
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 Thus, the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Fam-
ily Dissolution30 includes the following comment: 
By and large, the policy goal of frequent and continuing contact 
with both parents has not translated into rules requiring an equal 
or near-equal division of residential responsibility. While every 
state allows some form of joint custody, most states simply author-
ize it as a possible alternative rather than favor it.31 
                                                                                                                      
Custody Preferences, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985). Other authors demonstrating concern 
about strategic behavior in child custody cases include Martha Fineman, Dominant Dis-
course, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 727, 761 (1988), and Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Cen-
tury: How the American Law Institute Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect 
the Individual Child’s Best Interests, 35 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 467, 470 (1990). 
 30. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 2.08 reporter’s notes, at 211. 
 31. Id. § 2.08 cmt. a, at 211. A number of states have statutes that have some presump-
tion or preference favoring joint physical. Id. In California, Conneticut, Maine, Mississippi, 
and Nevada, the presumption is narrow, operating only when there is joint agreement be-
tween the parents. Id. States, such as Oregon, that give deference to the parental agreement 
also favor joint custody as agreed to by the parents. Id. “In an additional six states, the pref-
erence in favor of joint custody is overcome by a showing that the child’s best interests call for 
an alternative award, by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. This includes Idaho, Iowa, 
Kansas, Michigan, New Mexico, Missouri, and the District of Columbia. Id.  
  Only Florida’s presumption favoring shared parental responsibility is 
stronger, in that it can be overcome only if the court finds shared responsibility 
detrimental to the child and applies even when the parents do not agree to it; 
the effects of this presumption, however, have been substantially offset by 
other rules.  
Id. The Florida law provides the following: 
The court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be 
shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibil-
ity would be detrimental to the child. Evidence that a parent has been con-
victed of a felony of the third degree or higher involving domestic violence, as 
defined in s. 741.28 and chapter 775, or meets the criteria of s. 39.806(1)(d), 
creates a rebuttable presumption of detriment to the child. If the presumption 
is not rebutted, shared parental responsibility, including visitation, residence 
of the child, and decisions made regarding the child, may not be granted to the 
convicted parent. However, the convicted parent is not relieved of any obliga-
tion to provide financial support. If the court determines that shared parental 
responsibility would be detrimental to the child, it may order sole parental re-
sponsibility and make such arrangements for visitation as will best protect the 
child or abused spouse from further harm. Whether or not there is a conviction 
of any offense of domestic violence or child abuse or the existence of an injunc-
tion for protection against domestic violence, the court shall consider evidence 
of domestic violence or child abuse as evidence of detriment to the child. 
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (2004). The ALI did not have the benefit of two statutes enacted 
after its publication. The Maine statute provides: 
Allocated parental rights and responsibilities, shared parental rights and re-
sponsibilities or sole parental rights and responsibilities, according to the best 
interest of the child as provided in subsection 3. An award of shared parental 
rights and responsibilities may include either an allocation of the child’s pri-
mary residential care to one parent and rights of parent-child contact to the 
other parent, or a sharing of the child’s primary residential care by both par-
ents. If either or both parents request an award of shared primary residential 
care and the court does not award shared primary residential care of the child, 
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 Joint custody, as I use the term in this Article, means that time 
with the children is shared equally or nearly equally by divorced par-
ents.32 It is to be distinguished from joint legal custody, which is the 
norm in nearly all states and which gives both parents major deci-
sionmaking and information-receiving roles in the children’s lives.33 
The primary custodial parent in joint legal custody situations makes 
day-to-day decisions, and the child typically lives with that parent, 
most frequently the mother, for anywhere between seventy and 
ninety percent of the time. 
 Statutory presumptions about custody are important because they 
set the tone for bargaining34 for separating couples, about ninety per-
cent of whom will resolve their differences without litigating.35 In 
                                                                                                                     
the court shall state in its decision the reasons why shared primary residential 
care is not in the best interest of the child. 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, § 1653 2.D.(1), amended 2004 Me. Legis. ch. 711. Simi-
larly, the new Iowa legislation provides in part: 
 5. a. If joint legal custody is awarded to both parents, the court may award 
joint physical care to both joint custodial parents upon the request of either 
parent. If the court denies the request for joint physical care, the determination 
shall be accompanied by specific findings of fact and conclusions of law that the 
awarding of joint physical care is not in the best interest of the child. 
  b. If joint physical care is not awarded under paragraph “a”, and only one joint 
custodial parent is awarded physical care, the parent responsible for providing 
physical care shall support the other parent’s relationship with the child. 
Physical care awarded to one parent does not affect the other parent’s rights 
and responsibilities as a joint legal custodian of the child. Rights and responsi-
bilities as joint legal custodian of the child include, but are not limited to, equal 
participation in decisions affecting the child’s legal status, medical care, educa-
tion, extracurricular activities, and religious instruction. 
H.F. 22, 80th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2004), amending IOWA CODE § 598.41. 
 32. The last year that states were asked to report custody figures to the National 
Center for Health Statistics was 1990; nineteen states reported, and the average for joint 
custody was 15.7%, for mother custody 72.5%, and father custody 10.3%. SALLY C. CLARKE, 
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADVANCE REPORT OF FINAL DIVORCE STATISTICS, 
1989 AND 1990, at 25 tbl.18 (1995), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/mvsr/ 
supp/mv43_09s.pdf. The state reporting the highest joint custody rate was Montana (44%) 
and the lowest was Nebraska (4.1%). That year Oregon reported 14% joint custody. Id. 
 33. “Decisionmaking responsibility refers to authority for making significant life deci-
sions on behalf of the child, including decisions about the child’s education, spiritual guid-
ance, and health care.” ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 2.03(4). “Decisionmaking responsi-
bility is the Chapter’s term for what most states call ‘legal custody.’ It encompasses the au-
thority to make significant decisions delegated to parents over their minor children as a 
matter of law, such as those relating to health care, education, permission to marry, and to 
enlist in the military.” Id. § 2.03(4) cmt. f, at 125. 
 34. “This section states the criteria for allocating custodial responsibility between 
parents when they have not reached their own agreement about this allocation. These cri-
teria also establish the bargaining context for parents seeking agreement.” Id. § 2.08 cmt. 
a, at 180. 
 35. The ninety percent settlement figure, which is only a guess, comes from Mnookin 
& Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 951 n.3. See also MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 23, at 
134, 137-38; Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Le-
gal Rules and Transactions Costs, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 279, 280 (1993); Margaret 
F. Brinig, Unhappy Contracts: The Case of Divorce Settlements, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 241, 250 
n.52 (2005).  
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these settlement cases, a hearing may be necessary to finalize the di-
vorce and to incorporate the agreement the couple has already 
reached.36 Custody rules matter as they set “endowment points”37 for 
the bargaining couples. 
II.   BARGAINING AND DIVORCE 
 My first introduction to law and economics was not Richard Pos-
ner’s “market for babies”38 but Mnookin and Kornhauser’s Bargain-
ing in the Shadow of the Law,39 which stands, as my teaching inter-
ests have, at the intersection of dispute resolution and family law. 
Through the years, Bargaining in the Shadow remains one of my fa-
vorites both because it is so teachable and because it holds so many 
interesting ideas. In practice, as with many theoretical models, 
Mnookin and Kornhauser’s predictions do not always bear out. Their 
punch line is that with the change in custody laws (or endowment 
points) from a nearly infallible presumption in favor of the 
wife/mother to an indeterminate best-interest-of-the-child standard, 
women should lose.40 Because they would be willing to settle to avoid 
even a small chance of losing custody of their children, women should 
                                                                                                                      
 36. In Oregon, these cases are called “fasttrack” hearings. 
 37. Mnookin & Kornhauser call legal rules “bargaining endowments.” Mnookin & 
Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 966. 
 38. Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59 
(1987). The original paper containing the basic idea was Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978). 
 39. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 29. The idea and the title have spawned a 
number of papers in family law and other fields. For family law pieces, see Brian Bix, Bar-
gaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We 
Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145 (1998) (discussing problems with en-
forcement of premarital agreements when the parties’ judgment is clouded by love); Amy 
L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Mar-
riage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509 (1998) (women have the best bargaining power before marriage). 
For pieces in other areas, see Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow 
of the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 158 (2000); 
David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 473 (1999); Christopher A. Ford, War Powers as We Live Them: Congressional-
Executive Bargaining Under the Shadow of the War Powers Resolution, 11 J.L. & POL. 609 
(1995); Victor P. Goldberg et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent Domain: Valuing 
and Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between Landlord and Tenant, 34 UCLA L. REV. 
1083 (1987); Joseph L. Hoffmann et al., Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Death, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2001); Maureen O’Rourke, Legislative Inaction on the Information 
Superhighway: Bargaining in the Shadow of Copyright Law, 3 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 193 
(1997); Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public In-
terest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015 (2001); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargain-
ing in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471 (1993); Rachel H. Yarkon, Note, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawyers: Negotiated Settlement of Gender Discrimination 
Claims Arising from Termination of Employment, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 165 (1997). 
 40. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 978. 
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get less in property in an indeterminate custody system than they 
would under the older maternal preference rule.41 
 Empirical research has shown that even with changes in child cus-
tody regimes, not much has changed—neither with the way parents 
share custody time nor with the way they (and courts) divide prop-
erty.42 Nor, as we will see from the empirical investigation that follows, 
does what other couples presumptively get when they go to court very 
closely relate to what most couples settle for on their own.43 
 Scholars explain these apparent deviations from the Coase Theo-
rem44 in a number of ways. Some argue that the legal change did not 
bring about distributional changes because there were and continue 
to be significant transaction costs associated with divorce. That is, 
the rate of divorce changed.45 (As a practical matter, the reduction of 
                                                                                                                      
 41. Id. at 969-70, 978-79. 
 42. For previous considerations of the problem, see Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 35; 
Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s Equitable Distri-
bution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621 (1991); Robert F. Kelly & Greer 
Litton Fox, Determinants of Alimony Awards: An Empirical Test of Current Theories and a 
Reflection on Public Policy, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 641 (1993); Elisabeth M. Landes, Eco-
nomics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1978). For example, Yoram Weiss & Robert J. 
Willis, Transfers Among Divorced Couples: Evidence and Interpretation, 11 J. LAB. ECON. 
629, 656 tbl.4 (1993), show that divorced wives with children received a mean of $9,313 in 
no-fault states, compared to $5,220 in fault states (as we define them). In most of these 
studies, however, the difference in payouts is not significant. 
 43. The couples who actually litigate divorce cases differ from those who settle in a 
number of ways. Though the law (legislated and common law) certainly applies to both the 
litigating and settling groups, the litigators in family law seem prepared to sacrifice not 
only material resources but the well-being of their children to make a point. Mnookin and 
Kornhauser mention this, but in the context of the greater willingness of mothers to settle.  
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 956. People who choose to litigate rather than 
settle their divorce cases are also those who continue to ligitate after the divorce decree is-
sues. Instead of resolving things peacefully, they resort to what Fisher and Rye call the 
BATNA, or best alternative to a negotiated agreement. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, 
GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 99-106 (2d ed. 1991). 
 44. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 9 (1960). The 
Coase Theorem, at least in its incarnation that people should bargain to an efficient out-
come regardless of the way the law allocates rights, was first applied to changes in divorce 
laws in H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private 
Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437 (1986) (finding no increase in divorce rates, but 
change in alimony and property distribution). For other studies of the effect of the change 
in laws on divorce rates, see Douglas W. Allen, Marriage and Divorce: Comment, 82 AM. 
ECON. REV. 679 (1992) (challenging Peters’ assumptions about regional effects); Thomas B. 
Marvell, Divorce Rates and the Fault Requirement, 23 L. & SOC’Y REV. 543, 544-46 (1989) 
(finding a temporary increase); Paul A. Nakonezy et al., The Effect of No-Fault Divorce 
Law on the Divorce Rates Across the 50 States and Its Relation to Income, Education and 
Religiosity, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 477 (1995) (finding a temporary increase); Allen M. 
Parkman, Unilateral Divorce and the Labor-Force Participation Rate of Married Women, 
Revisited, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 671 (1992) (challenging Peters’ assumptions and finding an 
increase). Of particular interest is Leora Friedberg, Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce 
Rates? Evidence from Panel Data, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 608 (1998) (finding that unilateral 
divorces raise the rate). 
 45. See Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws and At-Fault People, 18 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 325, 326 (1998); sources cited supra note 6. Contra Ira Mark Ellman, 
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the general transaction costs associated with proving grounds for di-
vorce might be cancelled out by the increased transactions costs in-
volved with proving “best interests.”)46 Mnookin and others working 
with him explained that, despite the fact that awards under the new 
statute themselves might change, people would settle into the more 
familiar pattern of maternal custody with paternal visitation.47 Or 
there simply might be a change in the frequency of going to court 
rather than settling and a corresponding reduction of amounts paid 
to lawyers, increasing the couple’s financial pie.48 
 This Article offers another look at Mnookin and Kornhauser’s bar-
gaining paradigm, using the lessons learned from the literature on 
default rules and socioeconomics.49 The socioeconomic nomenclature 
hints that the result will be more nuanced, that feelings and distri-
butional consequences will factor into the account, and that any 
model offered will be subject to the scrutiny of empirical testing and 
“real life.” More generally, I hope to begin a discussion of bargaining 
not merely in the shadow of the law but also through the powerfully 
distorting lens of violated trust. I ignore for the sake of simplicity, as 
Mnookin and Kornhauser do, the forty to fifty percent of couples who 
are childless at divorce,50 since divorce bargaining in these cases feels 
                                                                                                                      
& Sharon L. Lohr, Dissolving the Relationship Between Divorce Laws and Divorce Rates, 
18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 341, 346-47 (1998) (using different definition of “no-fault,” finding 
no change). 
 46. Proving best interests may require the use of expert psychological or psychiatric 
testimony, as proving adultery or abuse typically did not. In conflicted cases, states may 
require appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child, and the cost will typically be as-
sessed to the parents. For example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) states, 
“The court may appoint an attorney to represent the interests of a minor or dependent 
child with respect to his support, custody, and visitation.” UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 
ACT § 310, 9A U.L.A. 13 (1973). This section of the UMDA has been adopted in Illinois, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washington. Attorneys for children or guardians ad 
litem are required in thirty-nine states plus the District of Columbia. Linda D. Elrod & 
Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Century Ends with Unresolved Is-
sues, 33 FAM. L.Q. 865, 880, 909 chart 2 (2000). For a description of how children actually 
work with their lawyers, see Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Em-
powerment of Child Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 895 (1999). 
 Alternatively, Stéphane Mechoulan shows first a rising and then a falling of divorce 
rates after no-fault. Stéphane Mechoulan, Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American 
Family, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 143 (2006). His explanation is that people are taking the 
new rules into account and delaying marriages, producing better marriages over time. Id. 
The explanation above may also be true—the undoubted decrease in transaction costs pro-
duced by no-fault may cancel, in effect, with the increase in costs brought about by the 
subsequent change in custody rules. 
 47. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 23, at 168. 
 48. See Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 35, at 294 tbl.2 (noting that a much higher per-
centage of cases used motions in fault-retaining states). 
 49. For a description of the field, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Law and Socioeconomics, 49 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 224 (1999).  
 50. In the sample of Johnson County divorces, Brinig, supra note 35, 169 of 348 cou-
ples, or 48.9%, had minor children when they divorced, so significant minority is not accu-
rate. “In 1989 and 1990, just over half of divorcing couples had children under 18 years of 
2006]                    PENALTY DEFAULTS IN FAMILY LAW 791 
 
one- rather than two-dimensional. What is left is the fairly typical 
case of a couple with at least one minor child, in perhaps a five to ten 
year marriage that has, in the language of cooks, “turned.”51 Perhaps 
it does not matter why, but a marriage begun with trust, hope and 
self-sacrifice has devolved into an exchange model (with tit-for-tat 
bargaining),52 perhaps into what Lundberg and Pollak call the “sepa-
rate spheres” marriage,53 and finally to impasse.  
 At a core level, the couple no longer trusts.54 My guess, though I 
have no data and am uncertain how I would get it, is that as with 
most other problems in marriage, this lack of trust can be found 
symptomatically or causally in their sexual relationship.55 One 
spouse (or both) may actually violate the trust by becoming involved 
sexually outside the marriage. One spouse (or both), even though not 
physically involved, may accuse the other of infidelity or the legally 
lesser “disloyalty.”56 Or, perhaps more commonly still, one (or both) 
spouses may feel that the other no longer takes his or her sexual 
needs fully into account. One spouse may not trust the other for ro-
mance or orgasm. 
                                                                                                                      
age at the time of their divorce, while 47 percent were childless or had children who were 
older than 18 years of age.” CLARKE, supra note 32, at 2 (citation omitted). 
 51. For men in the United States, the average first marriage lasts 7.8 years before it 
ends in divorce; women remain married for 7.9 years before divorce, on average. ROSE M. 
KREIDER & JASON M. FIELDS, U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF 
MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 1996, at 12 tbl.6 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/ prod/ 
2002pubs/p70-80.pdf. 
 52. Gary L. Hansen, Moral Reasoning and the Marital Exchange Relationship, 131 J. 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 71 (1991) (conducting an empirical study on how moral reasoning may af-
fect exchange orientation in marriage). For a discussion of the problems of tit-for-tat in 
marriage, see Margaret F. Brinig, The Influence of Marvin v. Marvin on Housework During 
Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1311, 1322 (2001). “Tit for tat” comes from the bargain-
ing literature. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
 53. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Mar-
riage Market, 101 J. POL. ECON. 988 (1993). In this unhappy marriage, couples descend to 
performing only the stereotypical husband and wife gender roles, with the man being 
merely a good provider and the wife merely a good homemaker. Id. at 997. This situation is 
similar to what Lloyd Cohen hypothesized for specific performance of marital services. 
Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and QuasiRents; Or, “I Gave Him the Best Years of My 
Life,” 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 300-01 (1987). 
 54. Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, “I Only Want Trust”: Norms, Trust, and 
Autonomy, 32 J. SOCIO-ECON. 471 (2003) (empirically showing the relationship between 
violation of internal trust norms and divorce). 
 55. For an attempt to answer some of these questions using empirical data, see Doug-
las W. Allen & Margaret Brinig, Sex, Property Rights, and Divorce, 5 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 
211 (1998). 
 56. Cultural anthropologist William Jankowiac studies infidelity. See James M. 
Donovan, Elizabeth Hill & William R. Jankowiac, Gender, Sexual Orientation, and Truth-
of-Consensus in Studies of Physical Attractiveness, 26 J. SEX RES. 264 (1989); William 
Jankowiak et al., Extra-Marital Affairs: A Reconsideration of the Meaning and Universal-
ity of the “Double Standard,” 13 WORLD CULTURES 2 (2002); see also HELEN E. FISHER, 
ANATOMY OF LOVE: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MONOGAMY, ADULTERY, AND DIVORCE 172 
(1992) (discussing a physiological component to adultery). 
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 At any rate, one spouse, typically the wife,57 cannot handle the 
unhappiness58 and files for divorce. Armed by counsel,59 and perhaps 
under the watchful eye of a mediator,60 bargaining ensues. 
 What happens to each spouse’s feelings during this transitional 
period? Both spouses will, to some degree, feel confused or conflicted; 
afraid of the unknown future; depressed,61 for to fail at marriage is, 
after all, to fail at something important; and lonely, since he or she 
probably has lost essential communication with the other spouse.62 
The primary custodial parent may also feel angry for having to deal 
with grieving children and overwhelmed by having to work and bear-
ing nearly sole responsibility for household and child care.63 Yet she 
will usually fare better psychologically because the routine, though 
complicated, at least resembles the old life.64 The noncustodial spouse 
may well feel violated as does the victim of a burglary.65 He may also 
feel blindsided and surprised.66 
                                                                                                                     
 57. Sanford L. Braver et al., Who Divorced Whom? Methodological and Theoretical Is-
sues, 20 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1 (1993) (finding the wife was the “dumper” two-thirds 
of the time); Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, “These Boots Are Made for Walking”: 
Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141 (2000) (studying what fac-
tors lead to this phenomenon). 
 58. See Liana C. Sayer & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Women’s Economic Independence and 
the Probability of Divorce: A Review and Reexamination, 21 J. FAM. ISSUES 906 (2000). 
 59. In the Johnson County “sample, of 140 cases with minor children under 14, all but 
10 of the wives were represented, and all but 47 of the husbands. Only two of the petition-
ers, both wives, were unrepresented.” Brinig, supra note 35, at 244 n.15. The numbers of 
unrepresented spouses are much higher in the Oregon data presented here, about forty-
one percent. 
 60. “In the 1998 Johnson County sample only three cases were resolved by a media-
tor.” Id. at 244 n.16. 
 61. For a discussion of the stages of divorce and the attorney as a guide to his client 
progressing through them, see Wilbur C. Leatherberry, Preparing the Client for Successful 
Negotiation, Mediation and Litigation, in NEGOTIATING TO SETTLEMENT IN DIVORCE 25 
(Sanford N. Katz ed., 1987). 
 62. For two discussions of this phenomenon, see STEVEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S 
LIVES (1998), and Nadine F. Marks, Flying Solo at Midlife: Gender, Marital Status, and 
Psychological Well-Being, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 917 (1996), for two discussions of this 
phenomenon. 
 63. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 
YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Marks, supra note 62. 
 64. See BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE 78 (1997) (arguing if di-
vorce promotes more self-confidence and self-awareness, it could reduce physiological ine-
qualities between men and women); CATHERINE KOHLER RIESSMAN, DIVORCE TALK: 
WOMEN AND MEN MAKE SENSE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 165 (1990) (again discussing 
the liberating effect of divorce on bringing out control and independence). 
 65. For a discussion of depression in noncustodial fathers, see Brinig & Nock, supra 
note 54, at 480 (finding nearly half a standard deviation more depression, even controlling 
for the divorce and economic events in their lives). For a Website indicating the depth of 
the anger, see that of the Indiana Civil Rights Council, supra note 10: 
Thank you for your interest, support, desire and commitment in helping to 
quickly overturn the most destructive, cancerous, inter-related set of problems 
existing in America for at least the past three decades—all of which are rooted 
in, and can be traced back to, the systematic and widespread, absolutely igno-
rant governmental and judicial devastation of the traditional ‘nuclear’ family 
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 We might expect several typical outcomes of divorce bargaining. 
One would be an extension of the “separate spheres,” or minimal per-
formance, solution envisioned for unhappy couples who stayed mar-
ried in Lundberg and Pollak’s article.67 Lundberg and Pollak argued 
that instead of threatening divorce, an exit strategy, couples who 
were no longer happy would revert to the minimum performance re-
quired of husbands and wives, or “separate spheres” behavior. That 
is, wives would perform as good housewives,68 and husbands as good 
breadwinners,69 because they could not be criticized by outsiders or 
their spouses for playing these roles.70 
 The assumed problem in the earlier piece on cohabitation was 
that the ALI domestic partnership chapter was selecting a default 
that no one wanted. Conversely, for commercial law, academics write 
that default rules are typically set to reflect what the parties, had 
they thought in advance, would have chosen,71 or what most people 
                                                                                                                      
unit, and the resulting massive financial, social, and moral deterioration irre-
sponsibly inflicted upon the People, the Businesses, and the Taxpayers of this 
Great Nation in wholehearted factory style. 
Id. 
 66. Thus, there are cases in which husband or wife trusts the attorney for the other, 
when that is not advisable. Examples include Hale v. Hale, 539 A.2d 247 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1988) (rescinding unconscionable separation agreement after wife trusted husband 
that separation agreement was a precondition to their reconciliation, apparently until hus-
band borrowed her suitcases to take his paramour on a vacation), and Francois v. Francois, 
599 F.2d 1286 (3d Cir. 1979) (rescinding property settlement between husband and es-
tranged wife after wife systematically bilked the husband of his considerable assets before 
leaving the marriage). There is also some evidence that men are more than occasionally 
surprised when their wives file for divorce. See Braver et al., supra note 57, passim (using 
the NSFH, authors note the large number of husbands who were surprised when their 
wives filed for divorce). 
 67. Lundberg & Pollak, supra note 53. 
 68. For example, they would ask for primary custody and would seek a share of the 
marital home rather than income-producing assets. Id. at 993-94; see also LENORE J. 
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 75, 216-17 (1985). 
 69. Some evidence of the phenomenon (without clear directions for the causation) can be seen 
in John H. Johnson IV, Do Long Work Hours Contribute to Divorce?, 4 TOPICS ECON. ANALYSIS & 
POL’Y (2004), http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1118&context=bejeap. Divorcing 
husbands would want very definite terms and see responsibility primarily through their financial 
contributions. See Robert E. Fay, The Disenfranchised Father, 36 ADVANCES IN PEDIATRICS 407 
(1989) (calling this devaluation of father’s role pathological). 
 70. The most powerful discussion of this role-stereotyping phenomenon appears in 
Grillo, supra note 63, passim. 
 71. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 413 (6th ed. 2003) (writing that 
default rules should “economize on transaction costs by supplying standard contract terms 
that the parties would otherwise have to adopt by express agreement”); Easterbrook & 
Fischel, supra note 4, at 1433 (“The gap-filling rule will call on courts to duplicate the 
terms the parties would have selected, in their joint interest, if they had contracted explic-
itly.”); see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and 
Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 835-36 (1985) (saying the aim of fraudulent con-
veyance law “should provide all the parties with the type of contract that they would have 
agreed to if they had had the time and money to bargain over all aspects of their deal); 
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of 
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would want.72 Alternatively, default rules, whether coming from leg-
islatures or courts, may be designed to fill contractual gaps in so-
cially efficient ways.73  
 The standard case for default rules in contracts was made by 
Charles Goetz and Robert Scott.74 They argued that rational contract-
ing partners might intentionally leave contract terms ambiguous, or 
incomplete. They might make incomplete contracts simply because 
the costs of continuing to contract were prohibitive or the unknowns 
too great. When encountering an incomplete but otherwise valid con-
tract after the relationship had broken down, the courts would sup-
ply the missing term. They might do so by deciding what the parties 
                                                                                                                     
Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) (“Ideally, the preformulated rules 
supplied by the state should mimic the agreements contracting parties would reach were 
they costlessly to bargain out each detail of the transaction.”). For a case law example, see 
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 468-69 (1960) (“[I]t may be fair to assume that 
had the parties anticipated the possibility of a breach by the promisee they would have 
provided that the promisor might protect himself by such means as would be available 
against the promisee under a two-party contract.”). 
 72. Goetz & Scott, supra note 71, at 971 (asking, “[W]hat arrangements would most 
bargainers prefer?”). This approach, according to Ayres and Gertner, is a “natural out-
growth of the transaction cost explanation of contractual incompleteness. Lawmakers can 
minimize the costs of contracting by choosing the default that most parties would have 
wanted.” Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 93. 
 73.  Promotion of efficient outcomes, as opposed to what the parties most often want, 
is the other justification commonly given for default rules. See Alan Schwartz, The Default 
Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389 (1993) [here-
inafter Schwartz, Default Rule Paradigm] (discussing various kinds of efficiency-producing 
norms); cf. Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1807, 1820 (1998) (“Commercial law instead provides parties with default rules that, 
at least in theory, direct the ex ante efficient result in standard cases.”); see also Charles J. 
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions 
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985); cf. Jonathan R. 
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An In-
terest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 236-40 (1986) (suggesting that for legislative 
gaps, statutes should be filled with public-regarding legislation).  
 The economic model of marriage, concluding that what should be maximized is “house-
hold production,” or some combination of consumer goods and the leisure time within 
which to enjoy them, is explained in relatively simple terms in Robert A. Moffitt, Female 
Wages, Male Wages, and the Economic Model of Marriage: The Basic Evidence, in THE TIES 
THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 302, 303-06 (Linda J. Waite et 
al. ed., 2000). Much of the work on the economics of households began with Gary S. Becker, 
A Theory of Marriage: Part I, 81 J. POL. ECON. 813 (1973), and Gary S. Becker, A Theory of 
Marriage: Part II, 82 J. POL. ECON. S11 (1974). See also GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON 
THE FAMILY (enlarged 1991). For a recent argument, see LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE 
GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, 
AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000). 
 74. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 73, at 321; Schwartz, Default Rule Paradigm, supra 
note 73, at 416 (claiming the responsibility for choosing default rules puts an unrealisti-
cally high informational burden on the courts); Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in 
Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 875 (2000). But see Eric A. Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 841 
(2003) (“[C]ourts employ a mix of majoritarian and penalty defaults. But it does no more 
than rationalize these practices, for there is no way to measure the variables that deter-
mine the relative efficiency of the rules.”). 
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were most likely to want.75 Later writers suggested that the gaps 
might be filled with terms that were most likely to be efficient over 
the long run of such contracts76 or that might be chosen to achieve 
the greatest social welfare.77 
 This default idea has been extended in many directions. One ex-
tention is to statutes that will be applied in construing contracts–  
particularly the U.C.C. Many of the Article 2 provisions dealing with 
contract construction can be thought of in this way, although con-
tract construction can also be aided by the parties’ course of perform-
ance under the contract, their course of dealings in past contracts, or 
usage of the trade within an industry.78 So is the doctrine that the 
general law will become a part of each contract.79 
 My study tests still another possibility for the default of joint cus-
tody here. What if joint custody presumptions function as a set of 
“penalty default rules,” designed to ensure that the parties contract 
around them80 or at least reveal privately held information?81 This 
theoretical possibility was suggested in the commercial context by 
Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner.82 Thus, setting a default 
quantity at “zero,” as the U.C.C. does, forces the parties to specify 
                                                                                                                      
 75. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 95; see also Posner, supra note 74, at 839-41 
(noting that to interpret ambiguous contract terms, courts might impose “majoritarian de-
faults” or might interpret terms according to what the parties would have expected had 
transaction costs been zero). 
 76. Thus, for example, placing the risk on the party most likely to be able to insure 
against it is most efficient. So is the ubiquitous doctrine of construing the contract against 
the drafter. 
 77. Macey, supra note 73, at 236-40. 
 78. U.C.C. § 2-208(2) (2004). 
 79. See In re Estate of Havemeyer, 217 N.E.2d 26, 27 (N.Y. 1996) (citing Strauss v. 
Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 63 N.E. 347, 349 (N.Y. 1902)) (“It is a fundamental principle that 
‘All contracts are made subject to any law prescribing their effect, or the conditions to be 
observed in their performance; and hence the statute is as much a part of the contract in 
question as if it had been actually written into it, or made a part of the stipulations.’ ”). 
 80. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 91. 
Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract an in-
centive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirma-
tively the contract provision they prefer. In contrast to the received wisdom, 
penalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would not want—in 
order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third 
parties (especially the courts). 
Id. 
 81. Id. at 94. In a provocative piece, Omri Ben-Shahar and Lisa Bernstein argue that 
sometimes the expectation damages measure is information-forcing in circumstances when 
the parties want more to keep information about costs, availability of suppliers, customer 
data, and business plans secret. Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest 
in Contract Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1885, 1886 (2000). They argue “that given the liberal ap-
proach to discovery in effect in American jurisdictions, the [Uniform Commercial] Code’s 
remedial provisions are not mere default rules, but rather are quasi-mandatory rules that 
cannot be fully contracted around.” Id. at 1889. 
 82. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 91. 
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some other quantity.83 Similarly, setting the availability of conse-
quential damages at “zero” forces the party for whom they matter to 
contract for their recovery (probably at a higher contract price).84 
Again, the law has extended the problem beyond simple contracts. 
For example, Scott Baker and Kimberly D. Krawiec85 develop a the-
ory of permissible congressional delegations that inquires about the 
purpose for the legislative incompleteness.86 
 I realize that the ALI reporters themselves were struggling in the 
Principles of Marital Dissolution with the problem phrased in a 
slightly different way: the rules/discretion debate.87 Many family law 
academics are loath to delegate too much to judges, particularly in the 
custody area.88 That is because the parties themselves have more in-
                                                                                                                      
 83. Id. at 95-96 (“If the parties leave out the quantity, the U.C.C. [§ 2-201] refuses to 
enforce the contract. . . . The zero-quantity rule can be justified because it is cheaper for 
the parties to establish the quantity term beforehand than for the courts to determine after 
the fact what the parties would have wanted.”). 
 84. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.). This is discussed in 
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 101-03. See also Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, 
Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Bax-
endale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991); William Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and 
the Economics of Insurance, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 241, 254 (1983). 
 85. Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 663 (2004). 
 86. Baker and Krawiec argue that,  
When faced with an interpretation dispute regarding an incomplete statutory 
provision, courts should first endeavor to discover the reasons for statutory in-
completeness. If the provision is incomplete for strategic reasons, meaning that 
lawmakers created an intentionally incomplete statute in an attempt to shift 
responsibility for the negative impacts of law to other governmental branches, 
then the courts should penalize lawmakers by holding that the provision is so 
incomplete that it amounts to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative au-
thority. In this way, the courts encourage legislative reconsideration or, in an-
ticipation of the penalty default, induce more precise legislative drafting. 
Id. at 664. 
 87. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 2.02 cmt. c, at 98 (“The question for rule-makers 
is not whether the law in this area should require determinacy or permit unbridled judicial 
discretion. It is, rather, what blend of determinacy and discretion produces the best combi-
nation of predictable and acceptable results, and what substantive values are most appro-
priately reflected in the mix.”); see also Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce 
Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 514 
(1996) (noting the convergence between discretion and rules, as discretionary standards 
applied through informal rules of thumb and formal precedents “typically . . . become more 
rule-like,” while “rules tend to produce exceptions”); Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and 
Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1181-
82 (1986); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face 
of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975); Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, 
Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA’s Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
2215, 2242-49 (1991).  
 88. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 2.02 cmt. d, at 98.  
However, the law can attempt to stimulate, or at least not inhibit, the motiva-
tions of parents to do well by their children. One of the ways it can do this is by 
respecting the decisions parents have made about their children in the past 
and by encouraging their planning for their children’s future. 
Id. 
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formation and know their parenting capabilities better than the courts 
are likely to know.89 Court-imposed solutions are less likely to be suc-
cessful over the long run90 because the parties will not have “bought 
into” them.91 Theoretically at least, the parties will learn about their 
own parenting styles and capabilities as they make plans for the chil-
dren.92 Judges also may not be consistent in their attitudes about what 
makes good parents.93 Some might disfavor working women in favor of 
fathers who had remarried stay-at-home wives.94 Others might prefer 
women to men, simply out of gender bias,95 or impose their own cul-
                                                                                                                      
 89. Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 498 (Cal. 1986) (Mosk, J., concurring) (noting 
that parents have better information upon which to make a decision about custody and 
truly love their children); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-33(1) (West, Westlaw through 2005 sec-
ond Special Sess.) (“[P]arent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are 
preferable to a court-imposed solution.”). Compare, in the commercial context, the words of 
Robert E. Scott:  
Thus, at bottom the case for formalism in relational contract turns on the rela-
tive implausibility of the empirical conditions necessary for activist incorpora-
tion: competent courts and incompetent parties. The evidence from the cases ad-
judicating contract disputes under both the Code and the common law is that 
the more likely empirical condition is competent parties and incompetent courts. 
Scott, supra note 74, at 875. 
 90. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 8 (“Chapter 2 assumes that parental agree-
ment is, generally speaking, good for children, and that it is difficult for courts to accom-
plish meaningful review that is likely to improve measurably those agreements.”). 
 91. See, e.g., MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 23, at 41-42 (discussing the inability of 
courts to obtain information about family circumstances, the vagueness of standards for 
reviewing agreements, and the court’s lack of control over parents to enforce agreements as 
written); Carl E. Schneider, On the Duties and Rights of Parents, 81 VA. L. REV. 2477, 
2485-86 (1995); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 
2401, 2463 (1995) (explaining that parental “rights” are important not for their own sake, 
but as a necessary part of the precommitment bargain that creates inventive for parents to 
act responsibly toward their children, and provides an “inducement to satisfactory parental 
performance”). 
 92. This is part of the rationale for the rapidly growing idea of the “parenting plan.” 
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 6 (“The cornerstone of Chapter 2 is the parenting 
plan, which is an individualized and customized set of custodial and decisionmaking ar-
rangements for a child whose parents do not live together.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(9) 
(West, Westlaw through Second Reg. Sess. 2006) (requiring a parenting plan in every cus-
tody case); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40.4.234(1) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.) 
(same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.181(1) (West. Weslaw through 2006 legislation) 
(same). See generally Jane W. Ellis, Plans, Protections, and Professional Intervention: In-
novations in Divorce Custody Reform and the Role of Legal Professionals, 24 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 65, 80-105 (1990) (discussing the various functions of the parenting plan). 
 93. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 8 (“Chapter 2 achieves greater predictability 
through structured, yet individualized, decisionmaking principles.”). 
 94. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Fennell, 485 N.W.2d 863 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); Olive v. 
Olive, No. 91CA005200, 1992 WL 139997 (Ohio Ct. App. June 17, 1992). 
 95. See, e.g., Landsberger v. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918, 919-20 (N.D. 1985) (up-
holding finding against a “strongwilled” “career mother” who believed that a “life limited to 
homemaking is not adequate to fulfill her needs”); Fennell, 485 N.W.2d at 863 (affirming 
order granting custody to the father); Hoover (Letourneau) v. Hoover, 764 A.2d 1192, 1194 
(Vt. 2000) (affirming order granting custody to the father); Patricia Ann S. v. James Daniel 
S., 435 S.E.2d 6, 16 (W. Va. 1993) (Workman, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that “both the 
family law master and the circuit court appear to have been bowled over by the fact that 
the father helped in the evenings and weekends”). See generally Karen Czapanskiy, Volun-
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tural stereotypes.96 Trying to get the parents to focus on what would be 
best for their children97 might simply produce better results for the 
children. It would also have the desirable effect of reducing litigation, 
always draining and expensive98 but potentially devastating for chil-
dren.99 State court trial judges who face family law cases for about half 
their caseload particularly wish not to have to “play Solomon” in cus-
tody situations.100 Since most of them were not family practitioners 
themselves, they are far more comfortable dealing with the financial 
problems of divorcing couples than treading the unaccustomed terrain 
of psychology and social work.101 The available materials suggest that 
the drafters of the ALI Principles considered the socially desirable rule 
in drafting its replication-of-existing-arrangements custody presump-
                                                                                                                      
teers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991); 
Ronald K. Henry, ‘Primary Caretaker’: Is It a Ruse?, 17 FAM. ADVOC. 53 (1994) (explaining 
that gender bias disadvantages men); Cynthia A. McNeely, Lagging Behind the Times: 
Parenthood, Custody, and Gender Bias in the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 891 
(1998) (same).  
 96. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 12 (“Chapter 2 prohibits consideration of race, 
ethnicity, sex, and sexual orientation. It also limits consideration of religion and sexual 
conduct to circumstances in which the child would otherwise be harmed, and it allows con-
sideration of the parents’ financial resources only to the extent necessary to consider 
whether the otherwise appropriate custodial arrangements would be feasible.”). 
     For a famous Iowa case in which the grandparents’ lifestyle was a factor in deciding 
against a widowed father, see Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966). 
 97. Note the tone of ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 7 (“As parenting plans move 
parents toward richer and fuller plans for the child, the limitations of traditional ‘custody’ 
and ‘visitation’ terminology become apparent.”). 
 98. See, e.g., Sinsabaugh v. Heinerscheid, 428 N.W.2d 476, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) 
(Foley, J., concurring) (noting that the litigation cost the mother $30,000, or two-thirds her 
annual income, and the father $50,000, or about half his annual income); In re Marriage of 
Rolfe, 699 P.2d 79, 81 (Mont. 1985) (conflicting testimony, including experts, took four 
days). In one study of one hundred appellate cases in each of the years 1920, 1960, 1990 
and 1995, the use of experts rose dramatically so that by 1995, experts were mentioned in 
thirty-eight percent of the cases. Mary Ann Mason & Ann Quirk, Are Mothers Losing Cus-
tody? Read My Lips: Trends in Judicial Decision-Making in Custody Disputes—1920, 1960, 
1990, and 1995, 31 FAM. L.Q. 215, 231 (1997). 
 99. Cochran, supra note 29, at 1; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 29. 
Note that even in the case where the parties could not agree, the ALI proposal was de-
signed to have the default be the “best interests” test: 
  The most important section, Bartlett claimed, is 2.09, on Allocation of Cus-
todial Responsibility. This imposes an “approximation standard” that requires 
allocation roughly proportionate to the amount of time that each parent has 
spent performing caretaking functions before separation—or if they never lived 
together, before the filing of the action. If such allocation would be manifestly 
harmful, or if the court cannot ascertain a prior history, it is to default to the 
best interests standard, she added.  
ALI Debates New Custody and Child Support Principles, 24 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) No. 29 
(June 2, 1998).  
 100. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
 101. Daniel W. Shuman, What Should We Permit Mental Health Professionals to Say 
About “The Best Interests of the Child”?: An Essay on Common Sense, Daubert, and the 
Rules of Evidence, 31 FAM. L.Q. 551, 565-69 (1997) (although mental-health professionals 
may not have any real predictive abilities as the “best interests” test assumes). 
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tion.102 It is not so clear that the socially desirable rule was chosen as 
the default in Oregon,103 which opted for a joint custody emphasis,104 
unless what the legislation really looked for was what it listed under 
subsection (3) in the new legislation: the formation of a parenting 
plan.105 This would seem to fit the “penalty default” explanation. Inter-
estingly, in a study Michael Alexeev and I did in 1993, we found that in 
Wisconsin, which had a predictable joint custody rule, the parties liti-
gated far more often and fathers were willing to give up property for a 
lesser share of custody as compared to Virginia, which had an indeter-
minate “best interests” rule.106 We generalized that “if the endowment 
point (or anticipated judicial outcome) bears very little relationship to 
what the parties really want, they are more likely to be forced to resolve 
their disputes themselves. They are, in effect, cast upon their own re-
sources, because the threat of litigation is not credible.”107 
                                                                                                                      
 102. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 2.02 cmt. b, at 96 (“Acceptance of the rules 
governing the allocation of responsibility for children also depends on the consistency be-
tween these rules and society’s basic values, such as freedom of religion, the ability to relo-
cate geographically, and equal treatment based on race and sex.”). Discussing the use of 
past caretaking allocations to govern post divorce custody,  
The allocation of custodial responsibility presumed in Paragraph (1) yields 
more predictable and more easily adjudicated results, thereby advancing the 
best interests of children in most cases without infringing on parental auton-
omy. It assumes that the division of past caretaking functions correlates well 
with other factors associated with the child’s best interests, such as the quality 
of each parent’s emotional attachment to the child and the parents’ respective 
parenting abilities. It requires factfinding that is less likely than the tradi-
tional best-interests test to require expert testimony about such matters as the 
child’s emotional state or developmental needs, the parents’ relative abilities, 
and the strength of their emotional relationships to the child. Avoiding expert 
testimony is desirable because such testimony, within an adversarial context, 
tends to focus on the weaknesses of each parent and thus undermines the spirit 
of cooperation and compromise necessary to successful post-divorce custodial 
arrangements; therapists are better used in the divorce context to assist par-
ents in making plans to deal constructively with each other and their children 
at separation. 
Id. § 2.08, cmt. b. Fashioning arrangements based on patterns of past caretaking is calcu-
lated to preserve the greatest degree of stability in the child’s life. 
 103. Or, for that matter, in Iowa, where denial of joint custody once one party requests 
it requires the judge to provide written findings of fact and conclusions of law saying why 
joint physical custody will not be in the child’s best interests. IOWA CODE ANN. § 
598.41(2)(a)-(b) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
 104. “The evidence is now overwhelming that children do best when they are nurtured 
and receive emotional and financial support from both parents. Parental conflict is harmful 
to children, and conflict during divorce is the most injurious.” Letter from William J. Howe, 
III, Chair, Oregon Task Force on Family Law, to Governor and Oregon Legislature (Dec. 
31, 1997) (on file with author). 
 105. Section 107.105(3), newly added in 1997, provides that it is the policy of the state 
to “[e]ncourage parents to develop their own parenting plan with the assistance of legal 
and mediation professionals, if necessary.” 1997 Or. Laws Ch. 707. 
 106. Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 35, at 290. This would not have been suspicious un-
der economic reasoning if the determinacy were the only difference. See George L. Priest & 
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
 107. Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 35, at 291. 
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 Finally, I would like to muse once again in this context about 
whether family law operates like the law of commercial contracts.108 
The law-and-economics view of commercial contracts is that they op-
erate in a real market where information flows freely and rapidly.109 
Contracting parties are relatively sophisticated, have clear ideas about 
their options,110 and can rationally decide what to put in contract and 
what to leave until later (or to chance).111 They can follow several 
schemes to minimize loss from this contract: they can hold a portfolio 
of such contracts,112 or they can insure against risk.113 They can breach 
if they wish to cut their losses.114 They can choose to isolate their in-
vestments from the rest of their wealth (by choosing a corporate form 
or by investing only as limited partners) in a way that married cou-
                                                                                                                      
 108. These musings are different from the ones permeating the PRINCIPLES dealing 
with rules/discretion problems, or allocations between the parties themselves and the 
courts. For my discussion of these issues in the context of child custody, see Margaret F. 
Brinig, Feminism and Child Custody Under Chapter Two of the American Law Institute’s 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 301, 307-08 
(2001) (“In fact, the entire Principles’ focus on written agreements, or ‘parenting plans’ can 
be seen as an effort to reduce discretion.”). 
 109. Easterbrook and Fischel note the following: 
Professionals trade among themselves in a way that brings the present value 
closer to the future value; if it is known that the stock will be worth twenty dol-
lars in a year, then people will bid that price (less the time value of money) 
now. No one has a good reason to hold off in this process, because if he does 
someone else will take the profit. The more astute the professional investors, 
and the more quickly they can move funds into and out of particular holdings, 
the faster the process of adjustment will occur. . . . The price reflects the effects, 
good or bad, of corporate law and contracts, just as it reflects the effects of good 
and bad products. This is yet another example of the way in which markets 
transmit the value of information through price, which is more “informed” than 
any single participant in the market. 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1431. 
 110. Note that “[t]he corporation’s choice of governance mechanisms does not create 
substantial third-party effects—that is, does not injure persons who are not voluntary par-
ticipants in the venture.” Id. at 1429-30. That is because “[i]nvestors, employees, and oth-
ers can participate or go elsewhere.” Id. at 1430. 
 111. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. 
REV. 1089, 1089-90 (1981) (“Parties in a bargaining situation are presumed able, at mini-
mal cost, to allocate explicitly the risks that future contingencies may cause one or the 
other to regret having entered into an executory agreement.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Con-
tract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 550 n.16 (2003) (“The risk-aversion or profit-maximization as-
sumption for firms follows from [the fact that] the amount at stake in any one contract com-
monly is small in relation to the size of the firm, so firms actually hold contract portfolios.”). 
 113. Id. at 599 (“This is because buyers in general are better insurers against lost 
valuations of specialized investments than are sellers; buyers usually are better informed 
than sellers about the consequences of sellers’ breach. Excusing the seller requires the 
buyer either to insure on the market or to reveal its valuation to the seller.”). 
 114. This is called the doctrine of “efficient breach.” See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 71, at 
118-20; Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 
(1982); Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). 
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ples, certainly, cannot easily do.115 There are few problems in commer-
cial contracts with third party externalities, since “third parties may 
be able to protect themselves without immutable rules.”116 
 One reason a strong joint custody presumption is not likely to 
work as a penalty default rule is that divorcing couples cannot pro-
cure insurance that the other party will perform as agreed during the 
marriage (let alone following a divorce),117 and hedging is at best non-
productive in this context, where hedging behavior probably means 
remarriage.118 Nor can there be an “efficient breach”119 of a separation 
agreement, although there can be modification of a court order. Fur-
ther, for couples with minor children, there are always third parties. 
Finally, by avoiding the default solution, what kind of information 
                                                                                                                      
 115. They may do so by contracting beforehand or by keeping title strictly in the name of 
the spouse wishing to retain the asset. Cohabitating couples, as opposed to married ones, 
typically will not be responsible for each others’ debts nor their support or medical care. 
 116. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 88 n.12. Of course, third-party externalities 
cannot be prevented so easily in the family context if there are children, as children are le-
gally unable to make contracts. Ayres and Gertner note that “immutable rules are justifi-
able if society wants to protect . . . parties outside the contract,” and go on to note that 
“[i]mmutability is justified only if unregulated contracting would be socially deleterious be-
cause parties internal or external to the contract cannot adequately protect themselves.” 
Id. at 88; see also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 2.02 cmt. b, at 96 (“The priority of the 
child’s interests over those of the competing adults is premised on the assumption that 
when a family breaks up, children are usually the most vulnerable parties and thus most 
in need of the law’s protection.”). 
 117. Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 
71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 786 n.241 (1993) (“Divorce insurance, however, has not yet arrived on 
the scene.”); Stephen D. Sugarman, Reforming Welfare Through Social Security, 26 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 817, 842 (1993) (“Divorce and separation, in this analysis, simply seem 
too willful relative to disability and death. Indeed, whereas life and disability insurance 
are available in the private market, divorce insurance is not.”). But see Homer H. Clark, 
Jr., Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 403, 412 (1971) (proposing a 
scheme of divorce insurance); Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without 
Fault: Can Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 82 (1991) (“It seems doubt-
ful that a purely private system of divorce insurance would be effective. Insurance systems 
are generally based on the idea that many more people will pay into the system than will 
be paid money from it. With the high rate of divorce in recent years, it seems doubtful that 
private companies would find the divorce insurance business to be a profitable one.”); cf. 
JOHN D. LONG, ETHICS, MORALITY, AND INSURANCE: A LONG-RANGE OUTLOOK 264 n.36 
(1971) (referring to an expanded list of risks, including “bizarre” idea of divorce insurance). 
The idea is at least entertained, in a context with more available antenuptial agreements, 
in Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work 
Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998). 
 118. Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 
1601 (1994) (book review) (contrasting cohabitation unfavorably with marriage because the 
cohabiting “couple, even more than the modern married couple, never ends the courtship 
behavior of looking appraisingly at every potential alternative mate”). 
 119. Margaret F. Brinig, “Money Can’t Buy Me Love”: A Contrast Between Damages in 
Family Law and Contract, 27 J. CORP. L. 567, 589 (2002) (citing Fred S. McChesney, Tor-
tious Interference with Contract Versus “Efficient” Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 
28 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 132 (1999)) (suggesting efficient breach as a possible origin of tor-
tious interference); Margaret F. Brinig, Some Concerns About Applying Economics to Fam-
ily Law, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY 450 
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005). 
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would the parties be revealing?120 If their real wish is to have the 
children live with them, the only way they would demonstrate that 
desire would be to trade off financial assets, which of course is hard 
on children and disadvantages the parent who would arguably do the 
best.121 If one demurs because of concern about the other party’s sin-
cerity in asking for joint custody, the reluctance might be miscon-
strued as a failure to cooperate (which in Oregon will affect the cus-
tody award). 
 While the Oregon statutes that frame our discussion here, like 
most state laws, do not state an explicit preference for joint custody, 
shared custody (or shared parenting) is certainly encouraged by sec-
tion 107.179, which refers cases in which the parties cannot agree on 
joint custody to mediation,122 and by section 107.105, which requires 
                                                                                                                      
 120. See Mary Kate Kearney, The New Paradigm in Custody Law: Looking at Parents 
with a Loving Eye, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543 (1996) (advocating a standard that assesses the 
credibility of a parent’s expressed desire to be the custodial parent and each parent’s effec-
tiveness). 
 121. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360-62 (W. Va. 1981) (“[U]ncertainty about 
the outcome of custody disputes leads to the irresistible temptation to trade the custody of 
the child in return for lower alimony and child support payments, [and is] very destructive 
of the position of the primary caretaker parent because he or she will be willing to sacrifice 
everything else in order to avoid the terrible prospect of losing the child in the unpredict-
able process of litigation.”); see also Neely, supra note 29, at 170-72. For a novel exploring 
these problems, with parents who were willing to sacrifice nothing except their child, see 
HENRY JAMES, WHAT MAISIE KNEW (1897). 
 122. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.179 (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 regular Sess.). 
   (1) When either party to a child custody issue, other than one involving tempo-
rary custody, whether the issue arises from a case of marital annulment, dissolu-
tion or separation, or from a determination of paternity, requests the court to 
grant joint custody of the minor children of the parties under ORS 107.105, the 
court, if the other party objects to the request for joint custody, shall proceed un-
der this section. The request under this subsection must be made, in the petition 
or the response, or otherwise not less than 30 days before the date of trial in the 
case, except for good cause shown. The court in such circumstances, except as 
provided in subsection (3) of this section, shall direct the parties to participate in 
mediation in an effort to resolve their differences concerning custody. The court 
may order such participation in mediation within a mediation program estab-
lished by the court or as conducted by any mediator approved by the court. 
Unless the court or the county provides a mediation service available to the par-
ties, the court may order that the costs of the mediation be paid by one or both of 
the parties, as the court finds equitable upon consideration of the relative ability 
of the parties to pay those costs. If, after 90 days, the parties do not arrive at a 
resolution of their differences, the court shall proceed to determine custody. 
   (2) At its discretion, the court may: 
   (a) Order mediation under this section prior to trial and postpone trial of the 
case pending the outcome of the mediation, in which case the issue of custody 
shall be tried only upon failure to resolve the issue of custody by mediation; 
   (b) Order mediation under this section prior to trial and proceed to try the case 
as to issues other than custody while the parties are at the same time engaged in 
the mediation, in which case the issue of custody shall be tried separately upon 
failure to resolve the issue of custody by mediation; or 
   (c) Complete the trial of the case on all issues and order mediation under this 
section upon the conclusion of the trial, postponing entry of the judgment pending 
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the court to consider awarding custody jointly.123 In addition, 1997 
legislation noted in its very first section that it was state policy to 
“[a]ssure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with par-
ents who have shown the ability to act in the best interests of the 
child.”124 The effect of this legislation was to strengthen the power of 
noncustodial parents, since denial of access to the children would 
give the right to terminate spousal or child support, change the par-
enting plan,125 or obtain an award for “makeup” visitation. The legis-
lative history for the bill shows that it was a compromise between 
men’s rights groups and those concerned about domestic violence.126 
                                                                                                                      
outcome of the mediation, in which case the court may enter a limited judgment 
as to issues other than custody upon completion of the trial or may postpone en-
try of any judgment until the expiration of the mediation period or agreement of 
the parties as to custody. 
   (3) If either party objects to mediation on the grounds that to participate in me-
diation would subject the party to severe emotional distress and moves the court to 
waive mediation, the court shall hold a hearing on the motion. If the court finds it 
likely that participation in mediation will subject the party to severe emotional dis-
tress, the court may waive the requirement of mediation. [This was added in 2003.] 
   (4) Communications made by or to a mediator or between parties as a part of 
mediation ordered under this section are privileged and are not admissible as evi-
dence in any civil or criminal proceeding. 
Id. 
 123. Note the change from “may” to “shall” in 1997 Or. Laws Ch. 707 (S.B. 243). 
 124. 1997 Or. Laws Ch. 707 (S.B. 243). 
 125. One Oregon fathers’ rights group that lists the Oregon legislation as a “father-
friendly” piece of legislation is Fathers Online. Fathers Online, http://www.peak.org/ 
~jedwards/fafr97.htm#243 (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
 As the recitation of remedies under the legislation shows, see 1997 Or. Laws Ch. 707 
(S.B. 243), many of the changes were administrative, making it easier for a party without 
legal counsel to enforce visitation and parenting rights, theoretically to the same extent as 
they can enforce child support awards. The statute also renamed “visitation” “parenting 
time” to make the difference one of quantity rather than quality. OREGON TASK FORCE, 
REPORT, supra note 10, at 11. In Iowa, however, effects would predictably be far stronger, 
since the 2004 changes were more substantive. 
 126. Hearing on S.B. 243, 244, 245, and 512 Before the S. Comm. on Business, Law & 
Government, 1997 Leg. (Or. 1997) (testimony of William J. Howe III, Chair, Oregon Task 
Force on Family Law), available at http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/legislative/legislativeminutes/ 
1997/senate/business_law_gov/sblg.404.html (discussing the tension between “dad’s rights” 
groups and domestic violence prevention groups and claiming that the legislation (S.B. 243) 
was a compromise). 
 During the Oregon House Subcommittee on Family Law hearings on the same matter, 
Representative Michael Fahey introduced H.B. 3172 on April 3, proposing that “may” be 
changed to “shall” for joint custody consideration. Hearing on H.B. 3207, 3172, 2981, 2982, 
2993, and 2693 Before the H. Subcomm. on Family Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 
1997 Leg. (Or. 1997), available at http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/legislative/legislativeminutes/ 
1997/house/judiciary/hjudfl.403.html. Fahey’s testimony shows that he believed that unless 
the judge had “hard facts to the contrary,” joint custody should be awarded. Id. The language 
changing “may” to “shall” was added to S.B. 243, and it now appears as part of OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 107.105(1) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.).  
 “ ‘It sets clearly a policy that in the absence of abuse or neglect, that it’s important for chil-
dren to have both parents in their lives,’ said [Rebecca] Orf, the Jackson County judge. ‘It 
now becomes the policy of the state.’ ” Maya Blackmun, Divorce Laws Aim to Protect Chil-
dren, OREGONIAN, Sept. 28, 1997, at B01. “The law also spells out the possible penalties for 
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 The rest of this Article will test whether the change in the Oregon 
Statutes is what most people would want (a standard default term), 
in which case there should be a substantially higher percentage of 
joint custody awards after its enactment than before, more media-
tion, and a higher number of enforcement petitions filed by pro se 
litigants, or whether it acts to disfavor primary custodial parents 
(largely women), as Mnookin and Kornhauser’s analysis would sug-
gest, in which case there should be lower child support or property 
judgments than before enactment. If the legislation functions as a 
penalty default, there should be more agreements after the statute 
and more filings of domestic abuse petitions, whether or not justified, 
to avoid application of the rule. If it does not function as a default 
rule, one would predict an increase in various kinds of transaction 
costs, including more court filings generally and higher fees. What 
we find is some evidence of all these possibilities, with quite strong 
effects even though this “event study” is hardly ideal, since the 1997 
changes in law were subtle and largely procedural.127 
III.   THE DATA 
 Between 1995 and 2002, there were approximately 125,000 di-
vorces in Oregon.128 As each Oregon divorce is granted, the Circuit 
Court clerk sends information to the division of Vital Records of the 
Department of Health and Human Services. This information, more 
                                                                                                                      
thwarting visitation—such as cutting alimony or child support, or ordering makeup visitation 
time or a hearing to change custody—for families and judges to better understand.” Another 
article noted: 
  A bill to help both parents have a role in raising their children after a divorce 
won final approval Tuesday in the Oregon Legislature.  
  Senate Bill 243 would give judges more power to enforce visitation rights for 
noncustodial parents, even to the point of stopping child and spousal support pay-
ments. It also would require divorcing couples to develop parenting plans.  
Jeff Mapes, Lawmakers Put More Parenting in Divorce, OREGONIAN, June 25, 1997, at B01. 
 127. In fact, as William Howe of the Oregon Task Force suggests, if the statute was de-
signed to increase joint parenting (meaningful contact), we have no way to measure this 
subtle variable (even as grossly as through hours with a parent) with our data. E-mail 
from William Howe to author, supra note 9. 
 128. E-mail from Joyce Grant-Worley, Manager, Health Statistics Unit, Center for 
Health Statistics, Department of Human Services, to author (May 18, 2004) (on file with 
author).  The e-mail shows the following data of Oregon divorces by year: 
1996     14,973 
1997      14,880 
1998      15,265 
1999      15,647 
2000     16,583 
2001     16,569 
2002      16,151 
In addition, there were 15,329 divorces in the 1995 records sent to the author. The total is 
125,397. 
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extensive than that collected in most states,129 includes the names, 
counties of birth and residence of each spouse, the age of each 
spouse, the date of marriage, separation and divorce, the identity of 
the plaintiff in the divorce action, the number of the marriage for 
each spouse, the date and way the previous marriage ended, the edu-
cation and race of each spouse, the number of minor children in the 
household, and the custody awarded for each child. I obtained copies 
of all this information. In addition, I matched each divorce to the 
Oregon Online Judicial Information Network (OJIN) to obtain spe-
cific information about the court proceedings surrounding the di-
vorce. Since 1991, OJIN has collected case information from each 
county’s circuit courts, which it makes available free of charge at 
various sites in Oregon and, for a setup and hourly fee, to online us-
ers elsewhere.130 The OJIN makes information data collection possi-
ble for each case on attorney representation, the number of court in-
cidents (including motions), the amount of fees charged, whether a 
party alleged domestic violence (and whether a protective order was 
issued), whether one alleged failure to pay child support or sought to 
change visitation or custody, and so forth. First, I randomly selected 
500 cases involving children for each of the eight years involved, 
nearly three years before the statute went into effect in late 1997 and 
slightly more than five years thereafter.131 After matching the two 
electronic databases for the 500 cases, identifying information was 
deleted from the files. 
 Each of the 4000 cases was coded for a total of eighty variables, 
thirty-eight of which came from the divorce certificates.132 After a few 
files were eliminated because the court records were missing or be-
cause neither parent received custody of the children,133 data analysis 
began. Descriptive variables appear in Table 1. Correlations revealed 
relationships between several variables of interest, particularly 
whether the couple’s separation took place after the statutory revi-
                                                                                                                      
 129. The only other states that continue to collect as much data, since the National 
Center for Health Statistics stopped compiling individual divorce data in 1995, are Con-
necticut, Montana, and Virginia. None of these states has judicial records online. 
 130. In order to obtain the data, human subjects review board permission was given for 
the matching, based upon names and type of actions that the process required.  
 131. SPSS, the statistical program, allows a random selection of any given number of 
cases. There were in excess of 7000 cases with children each year. 
 132. All files were cross-checked randomly by a second coder, and those files involving 
some discretion on the part of the law student involved, such as whether a domestic vio-
lence petition resulted in more than a fleeting protective order or whether mediation actu-
ally resolved the case, were reviewed a second time by Brinig. 
 133. In 166 cases, someone other than the parents ended up with custody. This result 
could have been because the children were institutionalized, because both parents were in-
carcerated, or because at divorce neither parent wanted to retain custody of the children 
and allowed other relatives to raise the children. In five cases, data about the children was 
missing from the divorce certificate. 
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sions went into effect.134 Significant correlations are reported in bold-
face in Table 2135 and can also been seen in Figure 3. Note that do-
mestic violence petitions are not related necessarily to when the cou-
ple separated and, in fact, may have occurred as early as 1982. The 
interesting date for them, therefore, is whether the petitions were 
filed before or after the statute’s effective date in 1997. 
 The change in the statute did apparently have one desired effect: 
there is significantly more joint custody (about 1.3 times the amount 
from prior years, or 30% more) in cases where the couple separated af-
ter the statute took effect than before.136 (See Table 3.) However, this 
increase is not inconsistent with the trend towards joint custody in 
Oregon. (See Figure 4.) Although there are more joint custody awards 
for the couples who separated after 1997 than in the preceding years, a 
longer view shows that this result might have occurred even without 
the change in statute.137 This comes out of the wives’ share—they have 
custody less often, while husband and split custody also increased, 
though less dramatically. (See Table 2.) After reading Mnookin and 
                                                                                                                      
 134. According to Oregon law, statutes ordinarily become effective ninety days after 
the date of passage (here, July 30, 1997). Although divorce laws and procedures theoreti-
cally may be salient before their passage, they will likely affect couples’ behavior when 
they are actively engaged in the divorce process and after divorce. The date of their separa-
tion seemed to be the best approximation available in each case. 
 135. Some of these correlations are interesting, but they are not related to our story. 
For example, separation after the statute is negatively related to the number of children in 
the household. Because the children in most cases were conceived without any thought of 
the divorce rules, there is probably no causal relationship one way or the other. The statis-
tical significance is likely due to the national trend for lower fertility (fewer children). See 
STEPHANIE J. VENTURA ET AL., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, REVISED 
PREGNANCY RATES, 1990-97, AND NEW RATES FOR 1998-99: UNITED STATES 13 tbl.4 (2003), 
available at www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr52_07.pdf. For a chart adding 2000 
and 2002 data, see http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0922182.html (last visited Jan. 28, 
2005). 
 Similarly, the positive correlation between the wife’s total years of education and sepa-
ration after the statute undoubtedly has more to do with the increasing numbers of women 
seeking higher education. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED BY PEOPLE 
25 YEARS AND OVER, BY AGE AND SEX: SELECTED YEARS 1940 TO 2004, tbl.A-1, 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/tabA-1.pdf. We might be more inter-
ested in the lower number of domestic violence orders issued, the fewer modifications of 
child support, the higher judgments outstanding, the higher percentage of cases filed by 
husbands (or both parties), or the larger number of cases resolved by agreement, especially 
mediation. The boldface indicates correlations significant at a higher than 0.95 probability 
that chance was not involved. 
 136. Again, please note that the Oregon terminology, as opposed to the way the federal 
government wants the status classified, and therefore the way the National Center for 
Health Statistics recorded the result is “parenting arrangements.” 
 137. This “longer view” was calculated using data from the National Center for Health 
Statistics, Marriage and Divorce Data, 1989-95 (issued Oct. 1997), available at 
http://www.nber.org/data/marrdivo.html. I extracted the Oregon divorces (a sample of the 
total divorces in the state—a total of 22,019 for the seven years), and eliminated those with 
missing custody data or those with no children. I totaled the number of children in each 
custody arrangement and divided the “joint custody” number by the “total number of cus-
tody children.” 
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Kornhauser,138 we might expect a change affecting custody rules to 
cause would-be sole custodial parents to settle for lower child support 
in order to get the custody they wanted. As far as the correlations and 
regressions show, there was statistically significantly lower child sup-
port. (See Tables 2 and 4.) In addition, the real amount decreased fur-
ther, given inflation.139 The law also apparently increased the number 
of domestic violence complaints, the number of complaints that re-
sulted in domestic violence orders, and the number of cases in which 
complaints did not result in orders. The change in the law apparently 
is also related to an increase in the petitions for modification of cus-
tody and visitation following divorce. (See the last two rows of Table 
2.) It also is related to increases in the litigation (per year) couples ex-
perience in Oregon (see Table 2, incidents/years between divorce and 
2004), the number of failed mediations (see Table 2, mediation, no set-
tlement), and the fees paid the court (see Table 2, fees charged). Con-
trary to the prediction made by the Task Force in Oregon, the number 
of pro se petitioners, even for parenting time modifications, did not in-
crease following the enactment of the legislation140 (see Table 2, nei-
ther represented by attorney), nor was there a statistically significant 
increase in filings to enforce visitation per year by pro se petitioners 
(see Table 2, pro se parenting time/custody motions per year, and Ta-
ble 9), though there was a significant increase in these motions when 
either party was represented.141 
IV.   REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 In order to rule out the possibility that the apparent relationships 
are caused by other variables, I devised a series of regression equa-
tions. They were designed to test the effects of the 1997 legislation on 
variables that might help answer the question of whether or how 
                                                                                                                      
 138. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 29. 
 139. Child support is set according to statewide guidelines mandated by Congress. Ore-
gon’s current version can be found online at www.dcs.state.or.us/forms/csf020809f.pdf. These 
went into effect March 26, 2003. The prior version appears at http://222.dcs.state.or.us/ 
oregon_admin_rules/guidelines_archive.htm. Before 2003, the amount authorized for two 
children with a combined gross income of $1500 a month was $375. For a combined gross in-
come of $3000 a month, the guidelines amount was $673. According to the inflation calculator 
found at the Bureau of Labor Statistics website, $375 in 1995 had the equivalent spending 
power of $442.67 in 2002. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov.  Con-
versely, $375 in 1995 would only have purchased $299.21 in 2002. Id. Similarly, the $673 in 
child support awarded in 1995 would only have purchased $536.99 worth of goods in 2002. Id. 
So despite the apparent lack of change, the recipient was worse off in 2002 than in 1995. 
 140. Making filing possible for pro se modification or enforcement petitioners was one 
of the explicit goals of the Oregon Task Force Report that proposed the 1997 legislation. 
OREGON TASK FORCE, REPORT, supra note 10, at 19.  
 141. See the regression results provided in Table 10, infra. When either spouse was 
represented, the correlation with custody or parenting time motions per year is 0.835 
(0.000). 
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joint custody functioned as a default rule. Results are displayed in 
Tables 3 through 10. 
 Table 3 addresses most directly whether the 1997 legislation func-
tions as a kind of traditional default rule, prescribing a presumption 
that couples would want, if left to their own.142 The variable of most 
interest here, as with all the regressions reported, is “separation af-
ter the custody statute took effect.”143 The entire equation predicts 
nearly 4% of the variance in the outcomes (joint custody rather than 
mother, father, or split custody). Held constant were other things 
likely to predict joint custody, particularly those associated with 
wealth, such as whether a spouse is on welfare; length of the mar-
riage which would be associated with the age of the children, other-
wise not in our data; whether the husband had been married previ-
ously;144 number of children in the household, which would be ex-
pected to be negatively related, given the logistics of such a venture 
with many children; and issuance of an abuse restraining order, 
which would also be predicted to be negatively related, since the 
statute so prescribes.145 Table 3 shows that indeed joint custody did 
significantly increase following the 1997 legislation: in fact, it was 
30% more likely to be awarded. However, as I noted previously, this 
increase might well have happened in any event—the only year in 
which the increase seems out of place is the year the statute went 
into effect. (Additionally, given the strength of the presumption, we 
might expect something approaching or exceeding 50%, rather than 
the 27% awarded after 1997.) Other large and significant coefficients 
were for the abuse restraining order (less than 40% as likely to 
award joint custody), spouse on welfare (only 60% as likely), and 
whether the husband had married previously (less than 90% as 
likely). There is some reassurance that the “penalty default” consid-
eration was not operating here, since the number of false claims of 
domestic violence was barely influenced by the legislation.146 
                                                                                                                     
 142. However, as noted before, this is to some extent the wrong variable. We really 
want to know not whether the total amount of petitions in these cases increased when the 
couple separated after the statute’s effective date, but whether petitioning did. 
 143. Whether the couple separated after November 1, 1997 turns out not to be as inter-
esting as when the domestic violence petitions were filed. 
 144. At least some of the previously married husbands may have had children from 
these relationships as well. Even if they did not, they might not take divorcing quite as se-
riously or might bank on marrying yet again and establishing a new family. 
 145. See OREGON TASK FORCE, REPORT, supra note 10, at 18. 
 146. Because a spouse who could “get out of ” joint custody might claim domestic vio-
lence even when there had been none, we did not include the variable in the same equa-
tion. Table 2 shows that there is no significant correlation with separation after the change 
in statute (more domestic violence allegations than orders, or false claims), and the corre-
lation coefficient is tiny in any event. 
 The joint custody variable will be endogenous in the child support table, and because the 
equation had a binary dependent variable and a normal system of equations could not be 
used, predicted values (residuals) were saved and used in the next equation (for Table 4A 
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 Tables 4A and 4B consider whether the change in the Oregon Stat-
utes operated in the way Mnookin and Kornhauser predicted: with a 
decrease in child support.147 The table shows that separation after 
the custody statute took effect, holding other things constant, was 
statistically significantly related to a decrease in the absolute dollars 
of child support awards, though the difference was quite small 
($63).148 The joint custody predicted (or residuals) variable, which 
would be expected to be negative, in fact was negative and signifi-
cant, though it had a much smaller effect ($7.85 less) than separation 
after the statute. However, as the discussion regarding the correla-
tions goes,149 a relatively constant amount translates into a net loss 
in buying power for the custodial parent because of inflation during 
the same time period. If the frequencies for each value are consid-
ered, it seems apparent that there was quite substantial variation 
from the amounts provided in the Child Support Guidelines, which 
should have looked like a series of steps. (See Figure 1.) Lumped to-
gether into ranges, however, a clustering toward the lower end of the 
distribution is quite apparent. (See Figure 2.) The biggest effects 
seen in the standardized coefficients of Table 4 are (positively) when 
the wife is represented by an attorney and (negatively) when the 
population density of the county is high, (meaning that higher child 
support awards were given in rural areas, which is quite puzzling 
since the guidelines are supposed to be effective statewide. Although 
the Mnookin and Kornhauser hypothesis cannot be conclusively 
proven or disproven by this result, it is perhaps significant that 
wives that are represented do better. Of course, this result may sim-
ply be another reflection of the effect of a higher income. 
 Tables 5A through 9 consider various types of transaction costs 
that might be associated with the change in the statute; it is here 
that the most significant results of the change can be seen. Tables 5A 
and 5B consider motions to modify or enforce child support. Although 
the absolute number of cases with motions to modify decreased sig-
nificantly following the statute, this result is not surprising because 
there was little occasion or reason to modify if the divorce, for exam-
ple, was granted in 2002. A new variable was constructed that con-
sidered the motions to modify per year between the granting of the 
                                                                                                                      
and 4B). The predicted values of the child support regression were fed into the child sup-
port motion/year equation reported in Table 5A and 5B. 
 147. Judgment, unfortunately, cannot be used to address the share of marital property 
awarded the wife. More often than not, instead of a property settlement, it reflected a 
judgment for past due child support. 
 148. This calculation holds other things, like joint custody, constant. Considered inde-
pendently, support decreased from $370.13 before the statute took effect to $341.03 after-
ward. See infra Table 11. 
 149. See discussion accompanying supra note 134.  
810  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:779 
 
divorce and 2004.150 Table 5 shows that following the statute, the 
number of cases with at least one motion to modify or enforce child 
support per year following the divorce significantly increased, with a 
slightly smaller effect than the amount of child support predicted in 
the preceding equation, but a larger one than whether or not a do-
mestic violence order had been issued in the case.151 Again, also im-
portant is whether either spouse was represented by an attorney (the 
coefficient for the pro se cases was negative). 
 Table 6 shows whether the incidence of domestic violence allega-
tions changed when the new statute took effect.152 Since these filings 
primarily take place before the divorce,153 they are not affected as are 
child support motions by the passage of time, so “per year” calcula-
tions were not used. There, the divorce law had precisely the effect 
that the skeptics of the statute would not have anticipated: the num-
ber of domestic violence complaints increased by more than four 
times following enactment of the statute.154 This variable was by far 
the most influential. Table 7 looks at the numbers of abuse orders is-
sued but finds a decrease of about twenty percent, again with statis-
tical significance. Other important variables include number of chil-
dren (positive), length of marriage (negative), whether the wife peti-
tioned for divorce (positive), and whether the spouses were repre-
sented by an attorney (positive—those who were pro se were less 
than seventy percent as likely to obtain an order). 
 Table 8 considers failed mediations: cases in which there was an 
assignment to mediation (as under the statute there must often be in 
Oregon custody disputes), but the mediator was not able to resolve 
the custody issue, and the case therefore went to trial (about four 
                                                                                                                      
 150. A similar, though logistic regression with Cox and Snell R2 of 0.116 was run hold-
ing the year of divorce constant (i.e., as an independent variable). In this regression, too, 
the number of cases with motions to modify or enforce increased significantly following the 
statute (exp. 1.38, sig. at 0.030). 
 151. Unlike the “false claims” problem, we could not predict that the actual incidence 
of domestic violence would increase as a result of the statute, so we could not include it in 
the equation. We could not include petitions relating to changes in or enforcement of cus-
tody or parenting time since these petitions would often be related to motions to modify 
child support per year. In fact, the correlation coefficient was 0.198 and was statistically 
significant. 
 152. Please note that for Table 6 and Table 7, the R2 are very small (0.044 and 0.042, re-
spectively). This data means that the vast majority of the differences in whether domestic 
violence was alleged or proven does not come from factors that were observable in our data. 
 153. In perhaps a dozen instances, the abuse claim was included in the divorce-related 
filings rather than considered separately. In less than five, it occurred after the divorce. 
 154. There was a domestic abuse petition in twenty-four percent of the cases. This sta-
tistic partly corroborates the finding of Demie Kurz that about seventy percent of the di-
vorces in Pennsylvania that she studied involved domestic violence, although orders were 
issued here in only slightly more than twenty percent of the divorces. DEMIE KURZ, FOR 
RICHER, FOR POORER: MOTHERS CONFRONT DIVORCE 33, 52-53 (1995). The same result 
holds true if the domestic violence allegation variable is made binary and a logistic regres-
sion run. 
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percent of the cases). Again, only a tiny percentage of the variance 
was explained by the three variables in the equation,155 but the legis-
lation does seem to more than quintuple the likelihood of a failed 
mediation. The failed mediation result appears to be related to the 
per capita income of the county, though the actual effect is negligible. 
 The 1997 legislation was in part designed to cut down on court 
time, that is, to streamline the process. In fact, it has apparently had 
the opposite effect, since, as Table 9 shows, the number of incidents 
per year has substantially increased since the legislation took effect, 
and the coefficient for this variable is by far the largest in the equa-
tion. Other things that are associated with more court incidents are 
representation (for either party) and whether an abuse restraining 
order was entered. The amount of child support is also related to the 
average incidents per year. 
 Finally, Table 10 considers whether the legislation increased the 
number of motions to modify or enforce parenting time or child cus-
tody. Again, because these motions always followed the divorce, the 
number had to be divided by the number of years that had passed 
since the divorce was granted. The answer is that the number did in-
crease significantly. Most of these motions were to enforce parenting 
time.156 The motions to modify appeared in a full twenty-three per-
cent of the cases and were, as one would expect, related to the num-
ber of children in the household. If the desire of the legislation was to 
make it easier for unhappy parents to enforce their visitation time, 
its purpose was clearly met. If it was to aid unrepresented litigants, 
it failed, since these litigants were importantly and significantly less 
likely to bring actions. If it was to cut down on court time, it has just 
as clearly failed. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 What can be made of the Oregon custody legislation? Placing a 
greater emphasis on joint custody through making cooperation a 
positive factor, streamlining the enforcement of custody and parent-
ing time, and renaming what used to be called “visitation” has had 
an effect on joint physical custody (or parenting time) awards, al-
though not nearly as large an effect as perhaps some of its advocates 
would have hoped.157 One possible answer is that joint custody is not 
                                                                                                                      
 155. The Cox and Snell R2 was 0.057. This small percentage may be because only four 
percent of the cases involved failed mediations. They tended to have the largest number of 
incidents. 
 156. Many more disputes probably occurred but were settled by the parties. Some-
times, especially in cases where child support was not involved, there were probably ad-
justments made in custody about which the parties never told the court. 
 157. Before the statute, about twenty-four percent of the cases resulted in joint cus-
tody. After the statute, joint custody awards represented thirty percent of the cases. 
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a true default choice: most people would elect to have some other ar-
rangement and consequently bargain around the new statute. An-
other possible answer is that in order for a rule like one of joint cus-
tody to operate, it must be more absolute, at least in the form of a 
presumption as in Iowa and Maine. 
 Evidence of “bargaining around” comes from the decline in the 
value of child support, including the absolute dollar amount, since 
the enactment of the statute. While the absolute number has been 
remedied somewhat under the revised guidelines that took effect in 
2003,158 the lack of significant clustering at guideline amounts (see 
Figure 1) and the fact that higher child support awards are made 
more often in rural counties indicate that in many, if not most, cases 
the amount is individually tailored. This leaves room for bargaining, 
despite the apparent rigidity and statewide applicability of child 
support guidelines. The data did not permit an analysis of property 
awards.159 Perhaps more troubling evidence of strategic behavior can 
be found in the increase in the number of allegations of domestic 
abuse where orders were not issued. Although the child support 
amount did not change much, the number of motions to modify or en-
force it did increase significantly following enactment of the statute. 
Together with an increase in custody and parenting time change or 
enforcement motions as well as increases in the number of cases in 
which mediation failed and in the average number of court contacts 
per year, the statute seems to have failed in its purpose of keeping 
family law cases out of the court system and in making access more 
available to pro se litigants. 
 Although I am trained in family mediation, I cannot find evidence 
that the mandatory or court-referred mediation plans put into place 
in Oregon have been particularly successful. Although the percent-
age settled by mediation changed from four to thirteen percent, the 
percentage of failed mediations increased as well, from two percent of 
all cases to six percent.160 Particularly disappointing, many cases in-
                                                                                                                      
 158. The new guidelines amount for two children when parents have a combined income of 
$1500 a month is $411, while it is $754 for a combined income of $3000. The first change does 
not meet the inflation rate, while the second exceeds it. DIV. OF CHILD SUPPORT, OREGON DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES SCALE, http://www.dcs.state.or.us/forms/csf020809f.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
 159. The spousal support amount seems to have decreased from an average of $165.89 
to $109.52 a month, though it was only awarded in about ten percent of the cases and thus 
is not statistically significant. 
 160. These failed mediation cases take up very significant court time. If the case is re-
solved by some other method, the average number of incidents is thirty-three. If the di-
vorce comes after a trial following a failed mediation, the average number of incidents is 
fifty-three. 
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volving domestic violence restraining orders seem to be mediated and 
to fail. (See Table 8.)161 
TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
VARIABLES N MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
Length of Marriage 3786 0.00 36.00 10.24 6.47 
Children in Household 3803 1.00 9.00 1.89 1.04 
Wife’s Age 3743 18.00 61.00 33.90 7.54 
Husband’s Age 3784 18.00 66.00 36.52 8.03 
Wife’s Years of Education 3184 0.00 17.00 12.87 1.99 
Husband’s Years of Edu-
cation 
3178 0.00 17.00 12.92 2.20 
Wife Represented by 
Counsel (1=Yes) 
3757 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.50 
Husband Represented by 
Counsel (1=Yes) 
3755 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.48 
Neither Spouse Repre-
sented (1=Yes) 
3755 0.00 1.00 0.41 0.49 
Binary: Was There a Do-
mestic Violence Allega-
tion? (1=Yes) 
3788 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.43 
Binary: Was There a Do-
mestic Violence Protective 
Order Issued? (1=Yes) 
3788 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.41 
Resolved by Agreement 
(1=Yes) 
3780 0.00 1.00 0.86 0.34 
Fees Charged by Court 3763 0.00 2739.21 302.10 177.94 
Incidents 3780 0.00 283.00 34.22 28.86 
Bankruptcy 3768 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.10 
Visitation or Child Sup-
port Motion (1=Yes) 
3763 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.42 
Child Support Amount ($) 2795 0.00 6900.00 357.62 464.33 
Judgment (Usually Back 
Child Support, $) 
3530 0.00 540,000.00 4109.05 23,340.27 
Husband Petitioned 
(1=Yes) 
3806 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.45 
Wife Petitioned (1=Yes) 3806 0.00 1.00 0.57 0.49 
                                                                                                                      
 161. For many years, the academic literature has suggested that cases involving do-
mestic violence are particularly bad candidates for mediation. Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation 
of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (1984). There were forty-eight cases in which there was a domestic 
violence order and a failed mediation and only sixty-nine with a successful mediation. Id. 
at 60-61, 113. This comparison of course does not include the other costs of forcing such 
spouses to mediate. This fact suggests that the safeguard provided by OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 107.179(3) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.) requires too high a standard. The 
qualification provides: 
If either party objects to mediation on the grounds that to participate in media-
tion would subject the party to severe emotional distress and moves the court 
to waive mediation, the court shall hold a hearing on the motion. If the court 
finds it likely that participation in mediation will subject the party to severe 
emotional distress, the court may waive the requirement of mediation. 
Id. Perhaps another sentence should be added making the exemption automatic if a 
party objects to mediation and a domestic violence order has previously been issued. 
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3806 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.35 
Contempt Action (1=Yes) 3765 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.28 
Resolved by Mediation 
(1=Yes) 
3740 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.28 
Mediation, No Settlement 
(1=Yes) 
3741 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.20 
Wife Has Custody (1=Yes) 3806 0.00 1.00 0.61 0.49 
Husband Has Custody 
(1=Yes) 
3796 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.28 
Joint Custody (1=Yes) 3796 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.44 
Per Capita Income of 
County (#) 
3806 16,927.00 36,356.00 26,373.34 4245.41 
Unemployment Rate of 
County (%) 
3806 2.20 14.00 6.10 1.95 
More D.V. Allegations 
than Orders (1=Yes) 
3797 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22 
Incidents/Years 2004-Year 
of Divorce (#/yr) 
3792 0.00 95.50 7.66 7.99 
Wife Lives Out of State 
(1=Yes) 
3806 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.20 
Husband Lives Out of 
State (1=Yes) 
3806 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.28 
Valid N (listwise) 2058     
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TABLE 2 
CORRELATIONS WITH SEPARATION AFTER THE CHANGE IN STATUTE 
VARIABLES SEPARATION AFTER EFFECTIVE DATE OF STATUTE (1=YES) 
 
 PEARSON  
CORRELATION SIG. (2-TAILED) N 
Length of Marriage -0.003 0.862 3721.000 
Children in House-
hold 
-0.022 0.178 3738.000 
Wife’s Age 0.041 0.014 3679.000 
Husband’s Age 0.022 0.183 3719.000 
Wife’s Years of Edu-
cation 
0.059 0.001 3134.000 
Husband’s Years of 
Education 
0.055 0.002 3127.000 
Wife Represented by 
Counsel (1=Yes) 
-0.032 0.054 3693.000 
Husband Repre-
sented by Counsel 
(1=Yes) 
-0.015 0.378 3691.000 
Neither Spouse Rep-
resented (1=Yes) 
0.012 0.464 3691.000 
Binary: Was There a 
Domestic Violence 
Allegation? (1=Yes) 
-0.026 0.113 3723.000 




-0.055 0.001 3723.000 
Child Support Mo-
tions (#) 
-0.101 0.000 3712.000 
Was Decree Modi-
fied? (1=Yes) 
-0.063 0.000 3715.000 
Resolved by Agree-
ment (1=Yes) 
0.125 0.000 3716.000 
Spouse on Welfare -0.064 0.000 3713.000 
Incidents -0.031 0.057 3716.000 
Fees Charged by 
Court 
0.095 0.000 3699.000 
Relocate-Custody 
Motion (1=Yes) 
-0.060 0.000 3704.000 
Bankruptcy -0.026 0.118 3704.000 
Visitation or Child 
Support Motion 
(1=Yes) 
0.004 0.822 3699.000 
Child Support 
Amount ($) 
-0.031 0.099 2756.000 
Judgment (Usually 
Back Child Support, 
$) 
0.045 0.008 3467.000 
Spousal Support 
Amount ($) 
-0.017 0.301 3658.000 
Contempt Action 
(1=Yes) 
-0.010 0.548 3701.000 
Husband Petitioned 
(1=Yes) 
0.035 0.030 3741.000 
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VARIABLES SEPARATION AFTER EFFECTIVE DATE OF STATUTE (1=YES) 
 
 PEARSON  
CORRELATION SIG. (2-TAILED) N 
Wife Petitioned 
(1=Yes) 
-0.062 0.000 3741.000 
Spouses Co-
Petitioned (1=Yes) 
0.041 0.013 3741.000 
Resolved by Affidavit 
(1=Yes) 
-0.021 0.205 3677.000 
Resolved by Stipula-
tion (1=Yes) 
-0.013 0.427 3678.000 
Resolved by Media-
tion (1=Yes) 
0.166 0.000 3676.000 
Resolved Through 
Trial (1=Yes) 
-0.010 0.553 3677.000 
Mediation, No Set-
tlement (1=Yes) 
0.094 0.000 3677.000 
Wife Has Custody 
(1=Yes) 
-0.092 0.000 3741.000 
Husband Has Cus-
tody (1=Yes) 
0.027 0.102 3731.000 
Joint Custody 
(1=Yes) 
0.066 0.000 3731.000 
Split Custody (Each 
Has One Child, 
1=Yes) 
0.032 0.051 3731.000 
Per Capita Income of 
County (#) 
0.180 0.000 3741.000 
Unemployment Rate 
of County (%) 
0.229 0.000 3741.000 
More D.V. Allega-
tions than Orders 
(1=Yes) 
0.073 0.000 3732.000 
Population Density 
(#/Mile) 
0.020 0.229 3741.000 
Incidents/Years 
2004-Year of Divorce 
(#/yr) 
0.334 0.000 3727.000 
Wife Lives Out of 
State (1=Yes) 
-0.010 0.556 3741.000 
Husband Lives Out 
of State (1=Yes) 
-0.065 0.000 3741.000 
Either Lives Out of 
State (1=Yes) 
-0.063 0.000 3741.000 
Pro Se Parenting 
Modification Motion 
0.009 0.575 3711.000 
Child Support Mo-
tions/Years 2004-
Year of Divorce (#/yr) 
0.110 0.000 3712.000 
Child Custody Mo-
tions/Years 2004-
Year of Divorce (#/yr) 
0.144 0.000 2641.000 
Was Domestic Vio-
lence Petition Filed 
After 1997? (1=Yes) 
0.222 0.000 3741.000 
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TABLE 3 
JOINT CUSTODY (COX & SNELL R2 = 0.036) 
 VARIABLES B S.E. WALD DF SIG. EXP(B) 
Separation After Custody Statute 0.256 0.080 10.324 1 0.001 1.292 
Length of Marriage 0.033 0.006 27.662 1 0.000 1.033 
Spouse on Welfare -0.454 0.143 10.043 1 0.002 0.635 
Husband’s Number of Marriages -0.117 0.071 2.745 1 0.098 0.890 
Protective Order Issued? -0.721 0.114 40.154 1 0.000 0.486 
Number of Children in Household -0.099 0.043 5.471 1 0.019 0.905 
(Constant) -0.970 0.148 42.785 1 0.000 0.379 
 
TABLE 4A 





 VARIABLES B 
STD.  
ERROR BETA T SIG. 
Separation After Effec-
tive Date of Statute 
(1=Yes) 
-63.463 19.953 -0.067 -3.181 0.001 
Children in Household 52.480 9.430 0.109 5.565 0.000 
Wife Represented by 
Counsel (1=Yes) 
164.473 19.117 0.173 8.604 0.000 
Incidents/Years 2004-
Year of Divorce (#/yr) 
5.797 1.198 0.102 4.840 0.000 
Either Lives Out of State 
(1=Yes) 
32.249 28.866 0.022 1.117 0.264 
Wife’s Age 3.693 1.226 0.059 3.012 0.003 
Per Capita Income of 
County (#) 
0.012 0.003 0.106 4.461 0.000 
Population Density 
(#/mile) 
-0.134 0.026 -0.120 -5.127 0.000 
Logit Residual of Joint 
Custody (from Table 3 
equation) 
-7.856 3.856 -0.040 -2.037 0.042 
(Constant) -239.899 78.406  -3.060 0.002 
 









 VARIABLES B 
STD.  
ERROR BETA T SIG. 
Separation After Effec-
tive Date of Statute 
(1=Yes) 
-70.832 21.692 -0.075 -3.265 0.001 
Children in Household 51.570 9.578 0.108 5.384 0.000 
Wife Represented by 
Counsel (1=Yes) 
165.756 19.115 0.175 8.671 0.000 
Incidents/Years 2004-
Year of Divorce (#/yr) 
6.097 1.209 0.107 5.042 0.000 
Either Lives Out of 
State (1=Yes) 
36.400 28.729 0.025 1.267 0.205 
Wife’s Age 2.846 1.400 0.046 2.033 0.042 
Per Capita Income of 
County (#) 
0.012 0.003 0.103 4.334 0.000 
Population Density 
(#/mile) 
-0.132 0.026 -0.119 -5.058 0.000 
Predicted Probability of 
Joint Custody (from 
Table 3) 
152.148 136.591 0.027 1.114 0.265 
(Constant) -242.748 79.459  -3.055 0.002 
 
TABLE 5A 







ERROR BETA T SIG. 
Separation After Effective 
Date of Statute (1=Yes) 
0.026 0.004 0.116 6.382 0.000 
Binary: Was There a Do-
mestic Violence Protec-
tive Order Issued? 
(1=Yes) 
0.018 0.005 0.066 3.574 0.000 
Spouse on Welfare 0.019 0.006 0.055 3.043 0.002 
Wife’s Years of Education -0.001 0.001 -0.014 -0.766 0.444 
Neither Spouse Repre-
sented (1=Yes) 
-0.013 0.005 -0.059 -2.749 0.006 
Husband Lives Out of 
State (1=Yes) 
-0.016 0.007 -0.040 -2.194 0.028 
Unstandardized Pre-
dicted Value of Child 
Support from Table 4A 
0.000 0.000  0.129 5.940 0.000 
(Constant) 0.025 0.015   1.636 0.102 
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TABLE 5B 





 VARIABLES B 
STD.  
ERROR BETA T SIG. 
Separation After Effective 
Date of Statute (1=Yes) 
0.024 0.005 0.108 5.129 0.000 
Binary: Was There a Do-
mestic Violence Protec-
tive Order Issued? 
(1=Yes) 
0.017 0.006 0.062 2.970 0.003 
Spouse on Welfare 0.031 0.007 0.090 4.267 0.000 
Child Support/1000 0.000 0.000 0.063 2.901 0.004 
Wife’s Years of Education -0.001 0.001 -0.021 -0.980 0.327 
Neither Spouse Repre-
sented (1=Yes) 
-0.018 0.006 -0.078 -3.123 0.002 
Husband Lives Out of 
State (1=Yes) 
-0.024 0.008 -0.061 -2.900 0.004 
Unstandardized Pre-
dicted Value of Child 
Support, from Table 4B 
0.000 0.000 0.114 4.398 0.000 
(Constant) 0.028 0.017   1.624 0.105 
 
TABLE 6 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ALLEGATIONS (COX & SNELL R2= 0.082) 
 VARIABLES B S.E. WALD DF SIG. EXP(B) 
Petition Made After 1997 1.459 0.112 171.008 1 0.000 4.303 
Length of Separation 0.000 0.000 4.912 1 0.027 1.000 
Length of Marriage 0.000 0.000 1.269 1 0.260 1.000 
Wife’s Age -0.036 0.010 12.433 1 0.000 0.965 
Husband’s Age -0.001 0.010 0.003 1 0.954 0.999 
Wife Is White 0.046 0.159 0.084 1 0.772 1.047 
Husband Is White 0.044 0.154 0.082 1 0.775 1.045 
Wife’s Years of Education -0.002 0.003 0.394 1 0.530 0.998 
Husband’s Years of Education 0.001 0.003 0.133 1 0.716 1.001 
Wife Lives Out of State (1=Yes) -0.542 0.251 4.681 1 0.030 0.582 
Husband Lives Out of State 
(1=Yes) -0.421 0.179 5.506 1 0.019 0.657 
Spouse on Welfare 0.516 0.129 15.881 1 0.000 1.674 
Wife’s Number of Marriages 0.184 0.088 4.428 1 0.035 1.202 
Husband’s Number of Marriages 0.189 0.088 4.662 1 0.031 1.209 
Number of Children in the House-
hold 0.165 0.044 14.108 1 0.000 1.179 
(Constant) -1.048 0.284 13.658 1 0.000 0.351 




DID AN ABUSE ORDER ISSUE? (COX & SNELL R2 = 0.042) 
 VARIABLES B S.E. WALD DF SIG. EXP(B) 
Separation After Custody Statute 
Took Effect 
-0.246 0.084 8.630 1 0.003 0.782 
Length of Marriage -0.054 0.010 28.575 1 0.000 0.947 
Number of Children in the House-
hold 
0.143 0.039 13.447 1 0.000 1.153 
Wife Petitioned 0.468 0.088 28.380 1 0.000 1.596 
Wife’s Age -0.001 0.008 0.012 1 0.914 0.999 
Spouse on Welfare 0.328 0.119 7.670 1 0.006 1.389 
Neither Spouse Represented -0.380 0.087 18.955 1 0.000 0.684 
Population of County 0.000 0.000 6.203 1 0.013 1.000 
(Constant) -0.939 0.247 14.469 1 0.000 0.391 
  
TABLE 8 
FAILED MEDIATIONS (COX & SNELL R2 = 0.061) 
VARIABLE B S.E. WALD DF SIG. EXP(B) 
Separation After Custody Stat-
ute Took Effect 
1.413 0.469 9.066 1 0.003 4.107 
Year Wife’s Last Marriage 
Ended 
0.103 0.028 13.245 1 0.000 1.109 
Per Capita Income of County 0.000 0.000 3.013 1 0.083 1.000 
(Constant) -207.584 56.550 13.475 1 0.000 0.000 
 











ERROR BETA T SIG. 
Separation After Effec-
tive Date of Statute 
(1=Yes) 
5.215 0.280 0.321 18.619 0.000 
More D.V. Allegations 
than Orders (1=Yes) 
4.413 0.679 0.112 6.503 0.000 
Wife Represented by 
Counsel (1=Yes) 
2.196 0.294 0.135 7.470 0.000 
Husband Represented 
by Counsel (1=Yes) 
2.611 0.303 0.155 8.628 0.000 
Child Support Amount 
($) 
0.002 0.000 0.086 4.892 0.000 
Binary: Was There a 
Domestic Violence Pro-
tective Order Issued? 
(1=Yes) 
2.345 0.346 0.118 6.783 0.000 
(Constant) 1.987 0.273   7.285 0.000 
  
TABLE 10 
AVERAGE CUSTODY OR PARENTING TIME MOTIONS PER YEAR  







ERROR BETA T SIG. 
Separation After Effec-
tive Date of Statute 
(1=Yes) 
0.032 0.005 0.137 6.887 0.000 
Wife Represented by 
Counsel (1=Yes) 
0.017 0.006 0.072 2.697 0.007 
Husband Represented by 
Counsel (1=Yes) 
0.017 0.006 0.069 3.029 0.002 
Neither Spouse Repre-
sented (1=Yes) 
-0.014 0.007 -0.061 -2.020 0.043 
Children in Household 0.004 0.002 0.032 1.677 0.094 
Spouse on Welfare 0.021 0.007 0.056 2.903 0.004 
Unemployment Rate of 
County (%) 
0.002 0.001 0.034 1.691 0.091 
Binary: Was There a 
Domestic Violence Pro-
tective Order Issued? 
(1=Yes) 
0.042 0.011 0.074 3.841 0.000 
(Constant) -0.001 0.010   -0.065 0.948 
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TABLE 11 








Resolved by Mediation (1=Yes) 0.04 0.13 
Joint Custody (1=Yes) 0.24 0.30 
Child Support Amount ($)     370.13       341.03 
Binary: Was There a Domestic Violence Allegation? 
(1=Yes) 
0.25 0.23 
Binary: Was There a Domestic Violence Protective Order 
Issued? (1=Yes) 
0.24 0.19 
Mediation, No Settlement (1=Yes) 0.02 0.06 
Child Custody Motions/Years 2004-Year of Divorce (#/yr) 0.03 0.06 

























CHILD SUPPORT AMOUNT 
STD. DEV. = 468.62 
MEAN = 380.0 
N = 2641.00 
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